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APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION

ABSTRACT

The advance of 802.11 b wireless networking has been beset by inherent and in-built
security problems. Network security tools that are freely available may intercept
network transmissions readily and stealthily, making organisations highly vulnerable
to attack. Therefore, it is incumbent upon defending organisations to take initiative
and implement proactive defences against common network attacks.

Deception is an essential element of effective security that has been widely used in
networks to understand attack methods and intrusions. However, little thought has
been given to the type and the effectiveness of the deception. Deceptions deployed in
nature, the military and in cyberspace were investigated to provide an understanding
of how deception may be used in network security. Deceptive network
countermeasures and attacks may then be tested on a wireless honeypot as an
investigation into the effectiveness of deceptions used in network security.

A structured framework, that describes the type of deception and its modus operandi,
was utilised to deploy existing honeypot technologies for intrusion detection.
Network countermeasures and attacks were mapped to deception types in the
framework. This enabled the honeypot to appear as a realistic network and deceive
targets in varying deceptive conditions. The investigation was to determine if
particular deceptive countermeasures may reduce the effectiveness of particular
attacks.

The effectiveness of deceptions was measured, and determined by the honeypot' s
ability to fool the attacking tools used. This was done using brute force network
attacks on the wireless honeypot. The attack tools provided quantifiable forensic data
from network sniffing, scans, and probes of the wireless honeypot. The aim was to
deceive the attack tools into believing a wireless network existed, and contained
vulnerabilities that may be further exploited by the naive attacker.
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The results indicated that the wireless honeypot was able to deceive wireless sniffing
tools Kismet and Netstumbler (see section 2.12.1) into believing a wireless access
point (AP) existed. However, network attacking tools NMAP and Nessus were not
altogether deceived into believing a network of varying Operating System (OS)
platforms existed within the wireless honeypot. The faked OS's on the wireless
honeypot could not be guessed on all scans conducted by the attacking tools, which
indicated that the deceptions deployed were not effective.
The implications of results demonstrated how deceptions might be used in network
defence as a means to improve organisational network security against common
network attacks. Additionally, the results indicated which areas of wireless network
defence would need further investigation to determine a more effective use of
deceptions.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

This research involves deployment of a wireless honeypot utilising a Honeyd
honeypot and 802.11b wireless network technology. A honeypot is a security
resource that is used for detecting and monitoring attacker behaviour in a network
(Spitzner, 2002a). Honeyd is a type of honeypot that uses operating system (OS) and
network emulation to appear real to an attacker. The Honeyd will be the primary
source for testing network attacks in the honeypot for this research. The wireless
capabilities that will be adopted for the wireless honeypot will be the IEEE 802.11b
standard. This will allow the deployment of a wireless access point (AP) that will be
used as the gateway entrance to the Honeyd virtual networks.

The intention of the wireless honeypot is to appear deceptively as a realistic network
of wired and wireless integrated services for various OS platforms. Scanning of
Internet Protocol (IP) address spaces and the probing of TCP/IP ports are popular
methods of OS fingerprinting. Their aim is to identify the platform and version of the
OS so that an attacker may discover a specific vulnerability to exploit.

The wireless honeypot is then an exploratory platform to investigate how deception
may be utilised in wireless network defence. This encompasses observation of results
from common attack tools used on the wireless honeypot. This will also allow the
effectiveness of deceptions to be measured, and interpreted by the researcher.

A literature review of deceptive origins and implementation is presented to identify
how deceptions may be deployed in network security. The various implementations
of deceptions is researched from animals, the military, and from cyber exploit of
deceptive capabilities. A framework for deception is developed to encompass the
deceptive possibilities examined in the literature.

The framework for deception is used to map existing network countermeasures and
attacks to a specific type of deception. This allows the researcher to determine how
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each deception may be deployed as a defence on the honeypot; and as a network
attack method. A devised matrix for each countermeasure and attack aids in the
identification of the conditions for deploying the deceptions in the form of deception
in depth.

Deception in depth (DiD) encompasses rings of varying deceptive strength, deployed
on the wireless honeypot. Each ring, moving outwards from the central core, abates
in deceptive strength. The focal point of the DiD is the wireless honeypot. The
second ring utilises Honeyd to create a virtual network topology containing
numerous OS and web server platforms. The third ring employs FakeAP to generate
false 802.11b network packets, and provide a subsequent entry-point to the Honeyd
virtual networks.

Additionally, a Central Logging Structure (CLS) that encompasses Honeyd log-files
and SNORT Intrusion Detection (IDS) logs records the network activity on Honeyd.
The CLS runs concurrently with any attacks performed on the wireless honeypot and
is thus part of the deceptive implementation.

Each ring in the DiD may be attacked using common network brute force tools.
These tools include Kismet and Netstumbler that stealthily detect wireless access
points. As well as Network Mapper (NMAP), that performs stealth TCP/IP port
scanning; and Nessus, that forcibly probes and identifies system vulnerabilities.

Several attacking tools are freely available for download from the World Wide Web
(WWW). The attacking tools NMAP and Nessus are popular choices for 'script
kiddie' attackers (Honeynet Project, 2000; Spitzner, 2003). Script kiddies are
amateur computer hackers that typically use tools that are easy to operate and require
little human interaction.

There is a diverse range of resources available from the WWW that a script kiddie
may use. Some examples of other wireless sniffing tools include Dsniff, WaveLAN,
2
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and AirMagnet. They are able to sniff out 802.11b access point signals and
configurations such as the IP, MAC, SSID (see section 2.12.1), signal strength and
channel of the AP, using a Linux or Windows machine.

System Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks (SATAN), WebTrends Security
Analyzer, and Argus, primarily used on Linux systems, are other examples of
network security tools used for detecting and exploiting vulnerabilities.

The effectiveness of deceptions used for defence on the wireless honeypot will be
evaluated from results gathered from the outputs of the attack tools used. Kismet and
Netstumbler will indicate if a bogus AP may be identified through wireless sniffing
of 802.11b packets. NMAP will scan IP blocks to enumerate OS platforms and
running services on ports. Nessus-generated reports of attacks will indicate if a
security warning or vulnerability may be detected on the selected IP addresses
scanned and probed.

The Honeyd log-files and IDS files, recorded during the same attack, is used to
triangulate the results of the attack tool Nessus and verify if the results are accurate.
A discussion of the results will then be used as a basis to explore possible
explanation and implications of the results ascertained from the wireless honeypot
experiment.

The research aims are to investigate how deceptive strategies may be used for
wireless network defence. The deployment of a wireless honeypot provides an
experimental basis for testing deceptive countermeasures and attacks. The result of
which may be beneficial for organisational understanding and implementation of
deceptions for network security.

3
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1.1 Significance of Research

Current studies and statistics show companies do not implement adequate security
measures for protection of wireless networked resources (Barnes et al., 2002; Nanda,
2002; Webb, 2002). Furthermore, the nature of existing 802.llb (see 2.10.1)
protocols subject sensitive information in wireless networks to remote attacks that
may not even be detectable.

Results from a conventional wired honeypot experiment revealed deception to be a
successful countermeasure to network threats generated by brute force attacks
utilising vulnerability scanners (Gupta, 2002; Yek & Valli, 2002). The combination
of wired and wireless services introduces new security issues. These hybrid networks
may utilise similar deceptive countermeasures to successfully defend against
malicious attacks (Nanda, 2002).

The primary purpose of the research is to ascertain the effectiveness of using
deceptions on the wireless honeypot to counter common brute force network attacks.
The wireless honeypot deployment aims to appear and perform as a wireless
network. The implementation of the honeypot is strengthened through the
development and application of a deceptive framework to investigate and apply
deceptive, defensive, or offensive mechanisms. The framework for deception is
utilised to determine if specific deceptions are more effective against particular
network threats.

Investigation of deceptive implementations on the wireless honeypot aims to identify
effective methods of deceptive network defence. Understanding how deceptions may
be deployed, and what outcomes may be achieved, may be significant for devising
better organisational defences. However, any small office - home office (SOHO) user
or organisations implementing a wireless local area network (WLAN), may find the
research significant for developing a defence for 802.11b insecurities.
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1.2 Research Questions
The significance of the study has outlined particular focus areas that will be
investigated in this research. A methodological formulation of the research questions
will provide clear goals for the researcher. The research questions for the wireless
honeypot experiment are:
1. Can a framework for deception be applied to common network
countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks?
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot against brute force attacks?
3. Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by the type of attack?

5
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 A Definition of Deception

Rue (1994, p.v) provides a definition of deception that is wide in scope, area, and
application: "[Deception is] the problematic distinction between appearance and
reality". However, a single statement may not convey all the fundamental
characteristics of deception. Therefore, the nature and properties of deception may be
described as:

[To occur] when the designs embedded in the morphology [meaning
the form or structure] and/or behaviours of one entity defeat the
designs embedded in the perceptual structures and/or strategies of
another entity (ibid, 1994).
It is essential to investigate the origins of deception and the diverse definitions that
have since transpired. Several descriptions and classifications of deception have been
observed and theorised by various authors that will be examined in the following
literature review.
2.1.1 Animal deception
Studies by Caras (1972) and Hutchins (1980) show plant and animal organisms to be
the earliest practitioners of deception for both defensive, and offensive means of
survival. According to Caras "Evolutionists would insist that their colors and patterns
are no accident; that there is some survival value in being marked the way they are"
(1972, p.4).

Bowyer (1982) suggests deceptive behaviour and physical distortion in various
species are determined by physical structure and genetic makeup that has emerged

6
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from a process of selection over the course of evolution, or possibly a single moment
of mutation. Furthermore, Bowyer states:

Any mutation that saves even one animal in 10,000 encounters of its
species with predators will be preserved and will firmly establish
itself in the species. It is these often almost imperceptible genetic
advantages that explain some of the bizarre hiding and showing
mutations that have been preserved and elaborated in nature (p.48).
Subsequently, anecdotal research of biological case studies facilitates understanding
and classification of deception throughout evolution. The biological evidence and
illustrative cases will be researched to determine deceptive origins, implementation,
and the impact of external factors in order to devise a framework for deceptive
pathways that network countermeasures and attacks may employ.
2.1.2

Taxonomy of deception based on biological case study

Bowyer (1982) stipulates two levels of deception, which are dissimulation - hiding
the real, and simulation - showing the false. The levels of deception apply to
psychological deception employed mainly by humans, but may also be mapped to
those physical deceptions demonstrated in animals.
Through the structure of deception in Figure 2.1, Bowyer defines deception as "the
advantageous distortion of perceived reality" (1982, p.47). Bowyer describes all
deceptions to involve hiding, and is divided into three categories: masking,
repackaging and dazzling. This is the first level of deception. A second level of
hiding the real is showing the false: which is mimicking, inventing and decoying.
According to Bowyer, all deceptions fall into either of these categories.

7
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THE STRUCTURE OF DECEPTION
(With process defined)
Deception
(Distorting reality)
DISSIMULATION
(Hiding the real)
MASKING
Conceals one's own
Matches another's
REPACKAGING
Adds new
Subtracts old
DAZZLING
Obscures old
Adds alternative

Level 1

}
}
}

SIMULATION
(Showing the false)

Characteristic
spectrum

Level 2

MIMICKING
Copies another's characteristic
spectrum

Characteristic
spectrum

INVENTING
Creates new characteristic
spectrum

Characteristic
spectrum

DECOYING
Creates alternative characteristic
Spectrum

(Bowyer, 1 9 82, p.6 1 )
FIGURE 2 . 1 The structure of deception
2.1.3

Biological examples of dissimulation - hiding the real

Masking

Masking is a form of hiding by blending into surroundings or seeking invisibility.
The advantage of a masked deception allows an animal to hunt prey with as little
possibility of being observed, or to integrate with the environment to conceal from
potential predators. An example of masking is demonstrated by a Polar Bear's white
fur that blends with their habitat of snow (Polar Bears International, 2002). The
masking aids their invisibility to hunt prey such as seals.
Repackaging

Hiding the real in the form of repackaging different or new attributes is the intention
of distorting perceptions through appearing dangerous, harmless, unobvious, or
simply conveying a particular attitude. Chameleons utilise changes in skin
pigmentation to repackage their appearances. This is done to communicate their

8
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willingness to mate (PBS, n.d.), and to hide from predators such as large birds
(Carthy, 1 972).
Dazzling
Dazzling is a mode of deception that is often employed when unsuccessful in
masking or repackaging, and when the predator has recognised its prey. Hence
dazzling is often a contingency manoeuvre to escape a predatory strike. Octopi utilise
dazzling deceptions by expelling a smokescreen of black ink that aims to impair the
predator's orientation, while the animal escapes danger.

2.1.4

Biological examples of simulation - showing the false

Mimicking
Mimicry is an "offensive deception" (Bowyer, 1982, p.50) employed by animals that
actively impersonate another life form through faked behaviour or appearances,
while concealing what is really their own. The mimicry should have bearing or
connection to the environment, or the potential host for the true advantageous effect
of the deceived target's distorted perception. The Cuckoo bird employs this type of
deception by mimicking the colour of other birds' eggs. It then abandons its own
offspring in their nests, to be fledged by a foreign parent.
Inventing
Inventing an alternative reality is a deception used by animals when hiding is not
possible, and there is no capability to mimic. An animal that utilises inventing
deceptions accessorises its physical structure with an attribute that appears to change
the entire reality of its appearance or actions for an intended advantage; such as to
gather food. A bioluminescent organ that protrudes from the usually dark coloured
Deep Sea Anglerfish invents a new reality because only the Anglerfish's organ may
be seen in the dark. This deception is used as bait to lure small fish to the Anglerfish
for food.

9
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Decoying
A decoyed deception is often used to distract predators from the discovered real.
Mother ducks use themselves as decoys by feigning injury to predators such as foxes.
This captures the attention of the predator and aims to deter them from the usually
nearby ducklings.

Bowyer suggests masking, repackaging and dazzling as deceptive methods employed
to hide real characteristics. Alternatively, mimicking, inventing and decoying are
methods to hide real characteristics from view and weaken the predator's ability to
identify and consequently hunt prey. These deceptions may be deployed in networks
with the similar objective of hiding real assets, while impairing the attacker's ability
to compromise.

2.1.5 Major types of deceptive effects sought
Similar to Bowyer's structure of deception, Gerwehr & Glenn (2003) specify three
deceptive effects which are sought from a deception: masking, misdirecting and
confusing. The deceptive 'effect' refers to a "specific type of disadvantageous
misperception the deceiver is seeking to produce in the mind of the target" (ibid,
p.36). This is described in Table 2. 1 .

Camouflage

Concealing signal

Concealment
Commingling with non-combatants
Signature reduction
Reducing signals, ideally to the point
of undetectabilit
Feint/demonstration

Transmitting clear and

unambiguous false

Decoy/dummy
Disguise
Disinformation
Divert attention, resources awa from
10
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real assets/activities
Raising the "noise" level

Generating additional commotion,
traffic, movement, etc.

to create uncertainty,
paralysis, degrade perceptual
capabilities

Shoot-and-scoot to disorient foes
Purposeful departure from established
pattern (conditioning/exploit)
Randomisation
Create 'noise', over saturation
un redictabilit , or the need for haste
(Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003, p.37)

TABLE 2. 1 Major types of deceptive effects sought
2.2 Evaluation of deceptive effects sought and the structure of
deception
Gerwehr & Glenn's' major types of deceptive effects sought show that masking,
misdirecting, and confusing effects also encompass the deceptive outcomes defined
by Bowyer. A summary of deceptive effects sought may therefore be expressed in
Table 2.2.

Attempting to blend with the
environment without attracting
attention.
Misdirect, Mimicry, Decoy

Luring attention by creating a
different scenario.
Obscuring presence with
exa erated actions.

TABLE 2. 2 Summary of deceptive effects sought
Upon defining various forms of deceptions from biological instances, the purpose of
executing a deception may be identified and further applied to any deceptive source.
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Consequently, humans may implement deceptive effects for network security that
may result as a mask, mimicry, or confusion.

2.3

Levels of Deceptive Sophistication

US National Security Research and Development organisation RAND, aims to
improve policy and decision making through research and analysis of several
governmental issues that include military deception. One focus area of RAND's
research in deception is military adaptation from plant and animal deceptive models
and precedence (RAND, 2003).

According to RAND (2001), and researchers Gerwehr and Anderson (2000)
deception may be classified into four exclusive groups: static, dynamic, adaptive and
premeditative. Each group is representative of a level of sophistication that an
organism may exercise over the deception, as described in Table 2.3.

The deception method is in place irrespective of state,
activit , or histor of either deceiver or tar et.
The deception method is employed by the deceiver when
circumstances tri er it.
The deception method is triggered as in DYNAMIC above,
but the method or triggering event may be modified by
feedback (i.e., trial-and-error).

\

Blending with each unique environment or adapting to each
situation.
Designed and implemented based on experience, knowledge
of friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities, and moreover,
observations about the tar et' s sensors and search strate ies.
(Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000, p.3 ; RAND, 2001)

TABLE 2. 3 Deceptive levels of sophistication
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2.3.1

Biological examples of deceptive levels of sophistication

Static
The colours of a Viceroy butterfly are an imitation of the poisonous Monarch
butterfly. The Viceroy's colours are static, of which the insect does not harness any
control (Ivyhall, n.d.). Thus, the deception remains unchanged regardless of the
circumstance.

Dynamic
A dynamic deception is displayed through the Walking Stick insect's ability to
stiffen its body, and change colour to it' s surroundings when triggered by fear
(Caras, 1 972).

Adaptive
The Lacewing larvae rob the wax from an aphid' s body to transfer onto their own, as
a protection and disguise from predators. This deception is employed upon
interaction with the Lacewing larvae' s predator, and surrounding environment
(Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003).

Premeditative
A premeditative deception is the most advanced level of sophistication. It involves
prior assessment of the circumstance, and results in a cognitive decision. Dolphins
and humans are characteristic of this level of sophistication, and thus have the ability
to implement a premeditative deception (ibid, 2003).

2.4 Defensive and Offensive Induced Deceptions
RAND Researchers Gerwehre & Glenn reason that a defensive or offensive
deception is "among one of the best methods for both successfully preying and
escaping predation" (2000, p. 1 6). This assertion holds merit, given that predators
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often utilise offensive, deceptive resources to hunt prey. Additionally prey will seek
defensive, deceptive measures to evade attack.

2.5 Summary of Biological Deceptions
The biological case studies discussed reinforce Bowyer's (1982) theory of the wide
variety of deceptive applications designed to suit each organism's available
resources. The classifications identified (Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000; Gerwehr &
Glenn, 2003; RAND, 2001) support nature's almost infinite selection of deceptive
applications. Whether fixed or flexible, physically dependent, or behaviourally
induced, there are "many deceptive methods that may accomplish similar ends"
(Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003, p.12) This may be for both defensive and offensive
purposes.
Deceptions thus implicitly encompass a level of complexity that the deceptive effect
may be exercised through. Humans however, are able to select which deceptions are
appropriate to apply to the circumstance. Therefore, implementing a network based
deception may require varying levels of sophistication to respond to the shifting
intensity of attack capabilities; such as the behaviour of many modem day interactive
attacking tools.

2.6 External Factors
Deceptive 'conditions' encompass a number of external factors that include the
predator and prey (Bowyer, 1982). The implications of external factors such as the
immediate environment, knowledge of the adversary, recent history, preconceptions,
and warning also have significant influence upon any deception of the prey and
predator (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003).

In The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operation, Gerwehr and Glenn (2000)
argue that in-depth operational deception should adapt to the urban environment
through synergistic strategies that are aimed to reduce opponent strength, and expose
14
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weakness. Additionally, the nature of the urban terrain, whether friendly or
dangerous, may affect the forces and processes of the battle where "Something
similar might be said of deception" (ibid, p.iii).

Gerwehr and Glenn (2000) infer that an effective, operational deception should
consider the combination of social and cultural conditions, physical infrastructures,
and all other unique characteristics of the surroundings. An integration of this
knowledge facilitates informed judgements, and decisions about deceptive actions.
Consequently, circumstance becomes a fundamental element of the deception.
Further research (ibid, 2003) has shown effective use of deception in urban conflict
to be valuable for offensive deception, defensive deception, and intelligence
gathering purposes.
2.6.1

The adversary and perception

The adversary, who is the intended target of the deception, is able to utilise its own
distinctive recognition and interpretation of sensory stimuli (eyes, ears, smell etc)
that is employed in a strategy of perception. This may include inch-by-inch scrutiny,
quick scans, random walks, or spiral searches (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003; RAND,
2001).

The assessment or perception of the adversary is formulated by insight, intuition, or
knowledge of the prey, which prompts an action. Thus, the deceiver must be aware
of such capabilities to be able to implement a deception that contends with those
adversarial tools of perception. Humans are akin to animals in making decisions that
affect survival (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003).
Decision makers rely upon their assessment of other actors' interests,
intentions, and capabilities, as well as an assessment of the
environment or context within which the action takes place...
[Hence,] It is incumbent upon decision makers to form accurate
perceptions (ibid, 2000, p.17).
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Implications of the adversary, referred to as the 'attacker' (see section 2.9), in
network security are similar to biological cases. The attacker's ability is considered
when deploying the deception. If the attacker is unskilled, such as a script kiddie (see
section 2.9.1), then the victim needs to become aware of the attacking tools and
methods typically adopted by a script kiddie. Therefore, this research will adapt
deceptive countermeasures that are able to contend with this attacker's common
choice of method and skill.

2. 7 Military and Human Adaptation of Deception
Gerwehr and Glenn (2003) state:
The unforgiving nature of natural selection, combined with a truly
staggering prevalence of deception, strongly supports the argument that
causing an adversary's perception to be inaccurate (i.e. degrading their
situational awareness) is of enormous value in virtually any setting or
type of conflict (p.12).
In this instance, the inaccuracy of perception is the result of deceptive capability.
Defence and intelligence communities recognise the significance of biological
deception throughout evolution. Subsequently, tactical planning of offensive and
defensive strategies have been derived from animal deception (2000). RAND (2001)
further supports mapping of animal biology to the military domain as highly useful
for gaining analytical perspectives.
2. 7.1

Military Definition of Deception

A definition of deception by the Joint Publication 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military
Deception cited in Gerwehr & Glenn (2003) states deception:

[To be defined] as those actions executed to deliberately mislead
relevant decision makers as to friendly military capabilities,
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intentions, and operations, thereby causing the relevant decision
maker to take specific actions that will contribute to the
accomplishment of the friendly mission (p.1 5).
DECEIVER

TARGET

Friendly forces

Relevant decision makers

Means of deception:
friendly action

Effect of deception:
response to falsehood

Deception conveys:
false friendly capabilities,
intentions, operations

Effect of response:
net gain for DECEIVER

(Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003, p.1 5)
FIGURE 2. 2 Deception: The joint definition

The military definition illustrated in Figure 2.2 is depicted as a relationship that
involves the deceiver utilising a means of deception to convey a false message to the
reciprocating target. According to Gerwehr & Glenn (2003), the response to
falsehood as an effect of deception is a "deliberately induced misperception" (p. 1 5)
resulting in an outcome as an advantageous gain for the deceiver.
The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) publish the
Air and Space Power Mentoring Guide, in which the essay Principles of War
emphatically states "The principle of the offensive suggests that offensive action, or
maintaining the initiative, is the most effective and decisive way to pursue and to
attain a clearly defined goal" (1 997, p.60).
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The essay then further explains premeditated defence as the primary strategy in war.
An offensive posture is empowered by resourceful and proactive conduct aimed to
achieve results and to subdue the adversary. A defensive posture should only be a
transient interval until an offensive posture may be restored. "No matter what the
level of war, the side that retains the initiative through offensive action forces the
enemy to react rather than to act" (ibid, 1 997, p.60). The paper firmly maintains that
an offensive stance is indispensable to ensure triumph over the adversary.
The paper also takes into consideration active and passive states within defence
operations. This implies that defence may strategically utilise proactive execution, or
yield submissive responses.
In a proactive situation, "deception is also a valuable mechanism of intelligence
gathering" (Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000, p.2). Despite complications in managing
deception, "there is little doubt that when employed successfully, deception is among
the most powerful instruments of conflict" (ibid, p.2).
Moreover, deception is not a single tool: it is a diverse array of
measures, which may be employed individually or in depth, alone or
in concert with more traditional defensive measures, as simple
schemes or complex ruses . . . There may thus be a synergistic effect
in the use of deception alongside other defensive measures (ibid,
p.2).

Figure 2.3 illustrates deception in depth utilising layered rings that express an array
of deceptive measures that aim to strengthen the defence. Deception in depth
demonstrates separate rings of deception and a reflected outcome for an attack on
each ring. The central core embraces the most effective deception and is thus
positioned closest to the protected asset. As the rings progress outward, the strength
of the deception abates, where the peripheral is the most vulnerable of rings.

The rings of deception are implemented with careful consideration of the adversary.
Different adversaries penetrate, and fall prey to deceptions in numerous ways
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depending upon their knowledge, experience, capabilities, determination, and
resources (ibid, 2000).

Deception 1

''

Deception 2
Deception 3

'

Attack 4
''

''

''

'

Attack 3
''

''

Attack 2

'

Attack 1

Deception 4

(Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000, p.2)
FIGURE 2. 3 Deception in depth

2.8 Evolving Deception in Cyberspace
Humans are excellent wielders of deception, even within cyberspace. This is
supported by the many deceptions implemented by humans including propaganda,
spamming, spoofing, viruses, steganography, virtual reality, encryption, and lying
(Hutchinson & Warren, 2002). Hence, the virtual world of anonymity yields almost
unrecognisable, yet successful deceptions.

However, "as humans become almost totally dependent on digital data for their
personal operational lives the consequences of deception increase exponentially"
(ibid, 2002, p.5). Consequently, there imparts a necessity to protect one's own assets

whether it is a person's identity, or data, in cyberspace. This may be achieved
19
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through employing deceptive strategies learned from the observation of deceptions
used in the animal kingdom, and the military.

2.9 Identifying the Enemy in Network Security
In animal deception, the enemy of the prey is the adversary. In network deception
and defence, the enemy has many names such as 'hacker' or 'cracker'. Computer
hackers may be defined as "an individual who experiments with the limitations of
systems for intellectual curiosity or sheer pleasure" (Schneier, 2000, p.43). Ethical
computer hackers aim to improve network security by breaking-in through network
penetration testing (Hartley, 2003). Hackers, who penetrate computer systems for
disruptive reasons, are branded as crackers. In this research, the computer cracker is
the enemy, and will be referred to as the 'attacker'.

Attackers use network penetration techniques to find vulnerable services running on
particular TCP/IP ports of a computer, so that they may compromise the system. Any
response from a TCP/IP port indicates that the particular port is active, and running a
service that is potentially exploitable by an attacker. OS detection through TCP/IP
fingerprinting determines the version number, and platform of the OS, so that a
particular vulnerability of the service on the TCP/IP port may be identified for that
version.

Network scanning of whole IP blocks or addresses, may be performed by automated
tools such as NMAP, which stands for 'Network Mapper' (Fyodor, 2003b). NMAP
determines OS fingerprints through a series of TCP/IP handshakes on TCP/IP ports
that make the target respond in a particular way.

Automated tools such as Nessus (Deraison, 2003a) perform OS detection by probing
specified targets through banner grabbing and port scanning. Nessus performs
vulnerability testing by directing known attacks on a service that is found running on
a TCP/IP port.
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OS fingerprinting is "extremely valuable" (Insecure.org, 200 3, <][2 ) for exploiting
computer vulnerabilities. This is because an attacker may then modify and tailor an
attack to the particular type of OS the victim is using, and thus achieving a greater
disruptive outcome. Therefore, understanding the methods used for remote OS
detection are a necessity for testing and improving network defence (Insecure.org,
200 3).

2.9.1

Script kiddies

The term ' script kiddie' is a derogatory term for the unsophisticated, though highly
dangerous, attacker (Search Security, 200 3; Spitzner,2002a, 2002b). Script kiddies
are typically immature attackers that use crude methods of compromise. They
predominantly aim to penetrate a system and gain root (highest administrative level)
access (Honeynet Project, 2000 ). A common technique is launching a buffer
overflow attack that may be targeted to a discovered OS vulnerability, enumerated
through port scanning.

A common modus operandi undertaken by a script kiddie is to scan random networks
to find a target. Once found, the target is exploited using automated tools that require
little understanding of their technical functionality (Honeynet Project, 2000 ;
Spitzner,200 3). These automated tools typically include NMAP and Nessus, among
other network scanning tools. Some script kiddies aim for the quantity of attacks
achieved (Search Security,200 3). This type of behaviour may multiply the threat for
damage that is caused by an unskilled attacker.

Although there are no definitive figures representing the number of script kiddie
attacks, Chamales and Klinger from the IEEE (see section2.10 .1) communications
society rationalise that as much as 9 5% of the attacking community are in the
amateur script kiddie category 2
( 00 3 , p.3). Additionally, Spitzner 2
( 002b), and
Cohen (1 9 9 9 ) also support that a vast number of attacks are executed by script
kiddies. Consequently, the concern for potential damage from a script kiddie is
emphasised, due to their numbers and their use of automated tools.

21

APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION

SUEN YEK

Therefore, the primary attack methods employed in this research will be based on
tools typically used by a script kiddie. This includes the network security tools
NMAP and Nessus. This will allow the researcher to investigate results of the attack
tools used that would be relevant and meaningful to organisations defending against
script kiddie attacks.

2.10 Comparing Wired and Wireless Networks
2.10.1 Wireless Network Protocols and Origin
Traditional wired networks have utilised cables and Ethernet connections for
communication of physically linked devices. Typical entry to the World Wide Web
(WWW) and private networks are via a discrete route. The arrival of wireless
networks encompasses a new-network structure that replaces wired media with high
frequency electromagnetic waves for data transmission across an air space.

In 1980 The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) released the
802.1lx suite of standards that specify the frequency range for wireless data
communications, and is currently the most prevalent standard for implementing
wireless local area networks (WLANs) (Montcalm, 2002).

The IEEE 802.1 lx suite currently comprises the 802.11 a and 802.11b standards.
However, standards for 802.1lg and 802.1li products, with more security, are under
development. The IEEE specifies the frequency range 2.4GHz in the Industrial,
Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band for the use of 802.11b compliant devices. At
present, 802.1lb compliant products, also known as Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity)
products, dominate the wireless market (Schoeneck, 2003).

The 2.4GHz band is shared by 802.1 lb (Wi-Fi) devices, microwave ovens, various
cordless phones, and some fluorescent lights. However, one major disruptor of
802.11b are Bluetooth enabled devices. Bluetooth is the name given to a technology
that uses small chips to connect short-range radio links that also utilises the 2.4GHz,
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ISM band. Several other wireless standards that may prevail in future are HiperLan-2
and 5-Unified Protocol (5-UP) (Nanda, 2002).

The deployment of WLANs differs largely from their wired counterpart's, mainly to
accommodate user mobility of wireless communications. The principal devices
required for wireless network communications are access points (AP), an antenna,
and wireless enabled clients.

APs plug into a power supply and connect to the wired LAN to function as a root
(central connecting) AP, or bridge connecting services to a wireless client. APs
broadcast beacons with signal strength and data capabilities depending on the type,
and strength of the antenna attached to the AP. Wireless clients such as laptops, or
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) affixed with an antenna, and suitable network
hardware, may then communicate with the AP through wireless packet exchange in
the form of beacons.

Users may gain access to wireless networks provided the wireless client is within the
coverage area surrounding the AP, and the signal is strong enough to support
communication. Wireless connectivity generally ranges from 1 0-300m from the
beaconing AP, and with connection of a antenna this range may extend to 24kms
(Barnes et al., 2002). However, this is largely dependent on the signal strength of the
antenna.
2.10.2 Future corporate wireless environment

According to Barnes et al. (2002), the corporate wireless environment will revolve
around three predominant application solutions: mobile messaging, mobile
office/corporate groupware and telepresence. These are described below with
explanation of some possible security drawbacks.
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Mobile messaging involves the extension of electronic mail to any wireless user
located within the internal corporate (wireless) messaging network environment.
Consequently, unintended wireless recipients may intercept confidential mail.

Outside wireless clients will also request equal access to the restricted corporate
services. These include the database servers, application servers, information and
news servers, directory services, travel and expense services, file synchronisations,
Intranet server browsing, and file transfers services. Therefore, providing the remote
user with the same localised access to the corporate wireless resources also opens
doorways for unintended recipients to retrieve confidential data.
Further to the wireless mobile office, increasingly integrated wireless-networking
technologies could unveil a revolution of interaction and communication between
people and data stores (ibid, 2002). The potential for universally accepted and
implicitly trusted wireless solutions, used in almost every context, is an optimism
held by many. However, the studies conducted by the Gartner Group also highlight
the growing concern of exploit of the corporate wireless environment:
•

By the end of 2003, nearly 35% - 40% of cellular-based wireless traffic will
be data

•

By 2005, 50% of Fortune 1 00 companies will have deployed wireless LANs
(0.7 probability)

•

By 201 0, the majority of Fortune 2000 companies will have deployed
wireless LANs (0.6 probability)

(ibid, 2002, p.4)
Additionally, the anticipated future wireless cost trends, illustrated in Figure 2.4
indicate rapid decreases in the cost per user in wireless LANs, which is highly
contrasted to marginal drops in wired LANs. Thus, the potential for wireless exploit
may also increase with the growth of WLAN adoption.

24

-

APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION

SUENYEK

'liirad LAH
---.

2001

2002

2003

-

200S

2006

(Barnes et al., 2002, p.23)
FIGURE 2. 4 Anticipated wireless cost trends
Though WLANs are not likely to completely substitute conventional wired LANs
(Nanda, 2002), WLAN solutions provide a means for wireless clients to interface
with wired LAN resources. The resulting hybrid networks allow interaction between
wired and wireless clients, currently utilised effectively in several academic,
corporate and home environments (Barnes et al., 2002; Nanda, 2002).

2.11 Reasons for Adoption of Wireless
"Wireless and mobile technologies are vital for the real-time enterprise" (Dulany,
2002, <jJ:3). Accompanied by exempt licence costs for bandwidth use in the wireless
frequency bands, the exponential growth (Barnes et al., 2002; Trilling, 2003) of
WLANs may be attributable to many factors (Barnes et al., 2002; Dulany, 2002;
Nanda, 2002) that are described below.
With the absence of wires, WLANs are cheaper and often more convenient to
implement. Limitations of fixed network APs are alleviated as wireless network
expansion and upgrades are more easily accomplished than their wired equivalent.
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The evolution of more powerful and compact wireless network components will see
continued demand of more tightly integrated application support, and communication
environments by consumers (Barnes et al., 2002, p.4). These will support greater
access speeds, communication capabilities, and versatility of portable information
appliances. Wireless information resources create greater portability through
increased roaming capabilities, and facilitate increased work production with current
throughput of 1lMbps and emergent standards such as 802.1lg allowing 54Mbps.
"Today's wireless solutions offer flexibility, performance, and proven solutions that
promise increased productivity and potential reductions of long-term capital and
management costs associated with network deployments" (ibid, 2002, p.9).
Thus companies capitalising on the benefits of wireless mobility, in combination
with increased development of wireless applications, assume significant risks
pertaining to security and reliability, and the increased potential for malicious client
activity (Barnes et al., 2002; Nanda, 2002; Webb, 2002; Wright, 2003).

2.12 Weakness and Threats to Wireless
A number of studies (Barnes et al., 2002; Liu, 2003; Nanda, 2002; Trilling, 2003;
Webb, 2002; Wright, 2003) show that many companies lack properly implemented
security over 802.11b wireless networks. Many physical aspects of wireless
technology and the infrastructure used, in addition to exposed encryption, and
authentication flaws further augment the threat to wireless networks (Schoeneck,
2003). The following is a description of various wireless security weaknesses that
may be considered.

2.12.1 Discovering wireless network vulnerabilities
"Internet protocols are publicly posted for scrutiny by the entire Internet community"
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003, p.403). Similarly Nanda (2002) states "of late there have
been several articles in the press regarding weaknesses in 802.11 WLANs."
Therefore, weaknesses may be rapidly discovered and published on the WWW and
any person may utilise such knowledge to seek out, and infiltrate vulnerable
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networks. For every 1 million systems an attacker scans, 10 000 may be
compromised (Spitzner, 200 3). Randomness of attacking tools and the attacker's
ability to relentlessly change and improve have become dangerously threatening to
wired and wireless networks alike (ibid,200 3, p.29).
Spitzner claims declined network security is largely attributed to the availability, and
growing trend of more powerful, fully automated attacking tools 2
( 00 3 ). This is
because script kiddies or unskilled attackers may easily operate many of these
attacking tools. They may also be retrieved easily from the WWW and yield little
understanding of how the software functions.
Wardriving

The term 'wardriving' is modem day network reconnaissance utilised by experts and
novices alike to discover wireless networks (Montcalm, 2002 ; Nanda, 2002).
Wardriving exposes WLANs usually by driving by metropolitan areas. This may be
done with approximate speeds of up to 90 km an hour, and by operating a wireless
client such as a laptop or PDA.
Conventional wired network scanning is performed by enumerating TCP/IP ports
and similarly, the same criteria may be applied to wardriving (Montcalm, 2002).
Additionally, stealth scanning of wireless traffic may be achieved by using packet
sniffing software such as Kismet (Kershaw,200 3), Netstumbler (Milner, 2002) and
Ethereal (Combs,200 3) to capture wireless traffic.
Nanda 2
( 002) surmised that in 60 % of cases, "security has proven to be absolutely
none". In Manhattan, the Bay Area, and New England over 1000 WLANs have been
exposed open to intruders 2
( 002). Studies conducted by Webb 2
( 002) revealed up to
50 % of Perth city WLANs deployed were significantly insecure. It was also found
that in many these cases, management were unaware of the security consequences
(ibid,2002).

Additionally, access to networks as far as 40 kms away may be achieved by using
powerful antennas such as yagi, which is not overly expensive (Nanda,2002). This is
indicative of the easy ability to detect distant WLANs and execute attacks remotely.
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Compromising a WLAN may be achieved by disrupting signals through a 'man in
the middle' (M-in-M) attack. This is where the attacker is positioned somewhere
between the AP and transmitting range of intended wireless clients. Intercepted and
disrupted signals from a M-in-M may relay false information, or devices may be
burned out, or damaged. Additionally WLANs offering D ynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) allow use of the network connection by rogue wireless clients
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003).

Access Point (AP) structure
One fundamental wireless security concern is the nature of the existing wireless
setup. APs may be typically positioned in locations that are ideal for maximised data
transmission, and user mobility. However, because APs may be probed by any client
within reach of the network' s electromagnetic radio frequency (RF) range, this
creates a physically unbounded entry point that is attractive for launching attacks
(Liu, 2003). Additionally, WLAN APs that are deployed behind conventional
firewalls are more appealing for launching attacks on the internal network (ibid,
2003).

Radio Frequency (RF) deviation
Data communication is achieved by electrical signals transmitted over the network
medium. Traditional wired networks bind data signals into the physical confines of
copper or optic cables, as example. Thus, data interception on the cable requires
access to the company router, and is restricted to the physical limitations of the cable.
Wireless data communications transmit electrical signals via RF waves, which freely
traverse the open space to any node within a connectable distance from the
transmitting AP. In contrast to controlled wired perimeters, RF signals are able to
penetrate through many furnishings, floors, ceilings, walls, and even reach outside
areas of the transmitting building. This may result in RF data transmission to
unsolicited recipients in any location accessible by the RF waves (Nanda, 2002).

The Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP)
Maintaining authenticity, integrity, and availability is another key security concern in
WLANs. The IEEE 802. 1 1 b standard specifies two types of authentication methods
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required for participation in a WLAN: open key and shared key. Both may optionally
utilise wired equivalent privacy (WEP) encryption. Each client is set to the
corresponding authentication method of the AP it wants to associate with.
Open key authentication is the default method, which allows a client to associate
with the AP without necessarily supplying the correct WEP key, and performs the
entire authentication in clear text. Similarly, in shared key authentication the AP
sends a clear text challenge passage that the client then returns encrypted with the
correct WEP key. Both are insecure (Fennelly, 2001; Nanda, 2002) as an intruder
may either attain the plain text challenge, and the encrypted text to decipher the key
in the case of shared key; or illegitimately authenticate to an AP, sidestepping the
need for a WEP key in the case of open key.
WEP uses Ron's Code 4, known as the RC4 symmetric stream cipher that supports a
variable length key of 64 bits. The RC4 algorithm was invented by Ron Rivest of
RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) Security Inc, and is used as the standard 802.1 1 b
WLAN encryption protocol. Symmetric keys use the same key and algorithm for
both the encryption and decryption of data. The original design goals ofWEP were:
•

To prevent unauthorised users lacking the correct WEP key from gaining
access control to the network

•

To protect WLAN data streams by encrypting them and allowing decryption
only by users with the correct WEP key

(Nanda, 2002, p.2)

The WEP protocol is widely known to be insecure, and is publicly posted on the
WWW to be "riddled with architectural flaws" (ibid, 2002, p.4). Researchers Fluhrer,
Mantin, and Shamir published the paper Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling
Algorithm of RC4 in which the researchers confirm RC4 is "completely insecure in a
common mode of operation which is used in the widely deployed [WEP] protocol"
(Fluher, Mantin, & Shamir, 200 1 , <J[ l ).
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WEP utilises an initialisation vector (IV) that is generated every time a packet is sent
or received via the Wi-Fi client. The IV has a maximum of 2 to the 24 bits long,
starting from 0, and incrementing by a value of 1 each time. Thus when the
maximum of 2 to the 24 IVs is reached, it will have to restart at O (Fluher et al.,
2001).

Referred to as the FMS attack, the paper explains how knowledge of the IV and the
first output byte reveal information about the key bytes. Subsequently, decryption of
captured packets became much easier after the paper was released (Nanda, 2002).

Furthermore, Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003) state that the likely cause for deficient use
of the WEP protocol is largely due to administrative difficulties in the configuration
and management of encryption. Additionally, surveys reveal that WEP has been
disabled in up to 85% of wireless installations. Pfleeger and Pfleeger also state that
"even when encryption is used, the design of the encryption solution sometimes
makes it easy to crack" (2003, p.401).

Service Set Identifier (SSID)
All packets sent by APs and WLAN clients contain the Service Set Identifier (SSID),
which is a rudimentary naming scheme that functions to logically segment networks,
and manage access control. SSIDs are not typically used as a network securing
mechanism, and should not be as APs are, by default, set to broadcast their SSID in
all beacons. An SSID may be guessed easily because they are often unassigned or set
to manufacturer default values (Nanda, 2002). An intruder could therefore ascertain
company SSIDs via social engineering means, or simply sniffing packets and
identifying the SSID in the packet payload, as it is often not encrypted.

Internet Protocol (IP) address spoofing
Similar to wired networks, wireless networks are also vulnerable to IP address
spoofing attacks where an attacker sends packets to the destination from an arbitrary
source IP address. Response packets are sent to the spoofed IP address and the
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identity of the real provoking IP is never disclosed. This method of attack may be
exploited in cases where the perpetrator wishes to send numerous probing packets
but does not wish to raise suspicion by disclosing the solitary perpetrating IP address.
Therefore, the victim' s intrusion detection or packet sniffing tools may fail to detect
a trend in port scans as malicious client activity.

Media Access Control (MAC) address spoofing
The Media Access Control (MAC) address is a physical, network identifier number
allocated to hardware vendors for installation onto wired and wireless Network
Interface Cards (NIC). All genuine MAC addresses are globally unique for each
LAN based device and may be used for authentication for granting users various
levels of network and system privileges. 802. 1 1 b wireless networks also utilise MAC
addresses for client tracking and authentication.

In nearly all 802. 1 1 b wireless NICs, the MAC address value may be modified to a
random number using vendor-supplied drivers, open-source drivers or various
application programming frameworks (Wright, 2003).

Amongst several publicly posted articles on the WWW, Wright (2003) demonstrates
the ease of changing a MAC address using the ifconfig command, or by executing a
short C program using Linux open source drivers. Alternatively, the applet in the
network control panel of a Windows OS may also permit changes to the MAC
address properties.

Depending on their skill level, an attacker may spoof a MAC address to masquerade
or hide their presence on the network. Or, they may falsely appear to be a valid MAC
address that is authorised by the network and AP, and consequently circumvent
access control lists or escalate network privileges (ibid, 2003).
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Obfuscating network presence may be utilised to launch brute force attacks on a
system by generating random MAC addresses for malicious packets. Though this is
often used to evade intrusion detection systems, a honeypot is able to overcome the
failed IDS detection, as all packets are rendered suspicious.

An attacker may bypass access control lists by obtaining a registered network MAC
address simply by passively monitoring network traffic. In addition to gathering a
valid list of MAC addresses from packet headers, which are broadcast in the open
when wireless clients communicate with APs.

Because MAC addresses are constantly broadcast in plain text in the header of
wireless packets, the crude acquisition and manipulation of MAC data is hence far
more common than on regular wired networks (Nanda, 2002; Wright, 2003).
Successful MAC address spoofs may grant the intruder unauthorised access to
control mechanisms that provide launching points for Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks, and advertise fallacious services to wireless clients (Wright, 2003). Thus, the
propensity for significant WLAN network destruction through MAC address
spoofing is high.
2.12.2 Penetration testing of networks and OS fingerprinting

OS fingerprinting is the technique for distinguishing the operating system of a host
through its network stack (layer 3 of the OSI model). Typical OS fingerprinting tools
probe for the known differing characteristics among OS's through identifying
features found in the probes of open TCP/IP ports (Beck, 2001; Fyodor, 2003a).

OS fingerprinting tools such as NMAP and Xprobe (Yarochkin & Arkin, 2003) are
designed to connect with the network layer, layer 3 of the Open Systems
Interconnect model (OSI), and therefore communicate using a sequence of TCP/IP
handshakes each time a connection is attempted on a port. Each OS's TCP/IP stack
responds to a handshake in its own unique way, which is how NMAP uses OS
fingerprinting to identify a particular OS.
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OS fingerprinting is an effective technique for enumerating a network as it gives
insight into the specific OS platform and version number. Once the OS architecture
is identified, a vulnerability scanner such as Nessus may be used to exploit any OS
weaknesses. The Nessus network vulnerability scanner will forcibly probe each
TCP/IP port on an OS for any known security weakness, and report findings to the
Nessus client (a Graphical User Interface). An unsophisticated attacker would then
investigate on the WWW a method to exploit the OS weaknesses found by Nessus,
with buffer overflow attacks.

2.13 Deception as a Network Countermeasure
For the scope of this research, networks aim to defend against script kiddies, as they
are the primary attackers. Countering network tools that these attackers use in the
electronic environment requires a deceptive system that is able to mimic actual
systems and networks. Thus, a network that acts real, aims to distort appearances by
hiding the real assets, and showing false values.

One of the first publications of organisational, electronic adaptation of deception is
Bill Cheswick's An Evening with Berferd: In Which a Cracker is Lured. Endured.
and Studied (1992). Cheswick described how deploying deceptive strategies in a
faked networked environment was valuable in learning the tactics and location of the
attacker, and eventually reported the attacker to authorities.
2.13.1 The Deception ToolKit (DTK)
In 1997, Fred Cohen released the first open source honeypot solution known as the
Deception ToolKit (DTK) on the WWW. Cohen's DTK is an effective tool for
countering attacks by enabling customisable PERL script files to simulate behaviours
of existing OS's. The system appears populated with known vulnerabilities that may
be exploitable by attackers.
The DTK gives the victim the advantage of early warning of an intrusion or attack,
while the attacker consumes time and effort to penetrate the deceptive OS's. The
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gathered evidence of all attacker activity 1s recorded in the DTK's logfiles.
Therefore, tracking the attacker' s activities allows the victim to identify the
vulnerability the attacker is targeting, and the tools that are being used. The victim
may then respond to the attacks with necessary actions. These actions may include
disabling or patching vulnerable services, and notifying the appropriate authorities.

Cohen (1 999) rationalises that increased organisational use and acceptance of the
DTK is likely to separate many of the less sophisticated attackers commonly known
as script kiddies, from the more advanced attackers. This is because of the efforts and
resources taken to compromise such deceptive systems. Consequently, the deceptive
ability of the DTK distracts attackers from the real assets and exhausts the attackers'
resources on the faked system.

2.13.2 Honeypot solutions

BackOfficerfriendly
In 1 998 the 'Cult of the Dead Cow' (cDc) community designed BackOfficer Friendly
(BOF) to combat the Back Orifice Trojan on UDP port 3 1 337. BOF is a honeypot
that also generates faked replies when a connection is made by an attacker to a
specific port on the computer, running the services Telnet, FTP, SMTP, POP3, or
IMAP2. BOF pretends to open the connection, while it logs the activity on the port,
generates an alert to the victim, and then closes the connection on that port.

Specter
Specter is a commercially supported, production honeypot (see section 2. 1 3.3) that
encompasses greater functionality and capabilities than BOF. It requires low
interaction, is easy to deploy, simple to maintain, and is low in risk.

Specter is able to emulate 1 of 1 3 different OS vulnerabilities at the application level
by providing application banners, and has extensive alerting and logging capabilities.
Small modifications on the Specter honeypot solution allow it to appear more
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realistic and hence it is slightly more interactive than BOF. An alerting function also
allows a system administrator to be contacted in real time. The information gathered
by Specter is limited; however it is ideal for confusing or wasting time for an attacker
(ibid, 2003).

Honeyd
The Honeyd incorporates the use of "Blackhole monitoring" (ibid, 2003, p.144),
which is the technique of monitoring and collecting data from entire network blocks
for analysis. Honeyd can successfully emulate hundreds of OS's at the application
and TCP/IP network stack level. Honeyd is also able to detect, capture, alert, and
monitor networks of millions of systems through real-time interaction with the
attacker using customised services.

Honeyd can actively simulate a whole network and sub network topologies. This
simulation may be achieved by instructing a daemon to route packets to nodes,
decrementing the Time to Live (TTL), showing attributes of packet loss, latency, and
Internet Control Messaging Protocol (ICMP) replies, thus performing as real network
packets traversing a network. Furthermore, Honeyd utilises a 'personality engine'
(Provos, 2003) to process network packet content such as stack behaviour of
fingerprinting formats of the virtual OS.

Address Resolution Protocol in Honeyd (ARPD), is a service that runs in
combination with Honeyd. When a connection request is made on an IP address,
Honeyd searches for the OS bound to that IP space in its configuration file. If there is
no assigned OS to the requested IP, then ARPD assigns the default OS. The default
OS is any OS that the researcher wishes to bind to all unassigned IP addresses within
Honeyd' s network.

Primarily designed for UNIX, Honeyd is relatively easy to install and configure and
is ideal for research. It may gather Internet trends of worm activity, exploit tools, and
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automated attacks (Spitzner, 2003). Honeyd is thus an appropriate honeypot for
investigating script kiddie attacks and attacking methods.

ManTrap
ManTrap is another commercial honeypot that does not emulate single services but
entire OS's and can create up to 4 virtual OS's. ManTrap incorporates extensive
administrative control, data capturing capabilities, and can simulate production
applications such as a DNS, web server, or database. A master OS monitors and
controls the attacker through mirrored partitions residing in cage-like environments,
where attackers are not able to exit and attack the host OS.

Honeynets
The honeynet is often the most difficult to deploy and maintain because it is a true
production system placed and monitored from behind a firewall, primarily deployed
for research into attacking tools and tactics. The extreme high interaction is due to
complete OS's in multiple honeypots deployed within a highly controlled network.
Hence, the honeynet is able to capture all activity, and decreases risk by containing
the attacker's activities. One major benefit of a honeynet is that newly discovered
risks may be addressed before the technologies are deployed in real production
environments (ibid, 2003).

2.13.3 Honeypot technology for intrusion detection
"A honeypot is a security resource whose value is in being probed, attacked, or
compromised" (Spitzner, 2003, p.3). A honeypot's prime stratagem encompasses the
use of deception to either mitigate risks through detecting attacks in the form of
production honeypots; or gain knowledge of the hacking communities' tools and
tactics in the form of research honeypots.

Lance Spitzner, founder of the Honeynet project vigorously advocates for the use of
honeypot technology as it gives victims control and greater understanding of hacker
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activity (2003). A greater ability to identify, detect or capture the attacker is decided
by the type of honeypot constructed and its deployment (ibid, 2003). This is
analogous to the deceptive lessons of animals as the effective implementation of the
honeypot deception may be produced from clear deceptive goals, knowledge of the
adversary, and the environmental circumstances.

Results from a recent study (Yek & Valli, 2002) showed a research honeypot
deployed in a wired network environment effectively deceived popular brute force
attacking tools Nessus and NMAP. The honeypot in this study utilised Cohen's DTK
as the deceptive tool. The honeypot was attacked and, buffer overflows were
manually counted and cross-evaluated with Nessus reports to provide evidence of
effective deception against a would-be attacker.

Benefits ofproduction honeypots
Production honeypots are useful when deployed to detect and report on abnormal
network activity. Network traffic is not usually configured to be directed through a
honeypot. This configuration may reduce the problem of false positives and
consequently, the only packets sent to the honeypot have no purposeful function
except harm.

The "valuable information" (Spitzner, 2003, p.59) collected and aggregated may
identify a scan, probe or attack. The information may then be used to establish trend
analysis and statistical modelling of targeted ports, services and protocols used. This
aids in detecting and researching attacks and attack methods. More importantly, this
identifies an organisation's exposed vulnerabilities that an attacker may be targeting.
Thus a return on investment through definitive results and minimal cost provide
incentive for honeypot use in deceptive environments to protect assets (ibid, 2003).
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Benefits of research honeypots

Many lessons may be learnt from the deployment of research honeypots, which do
not aid to reduce risk to organisations. Rather, research honeypots gather information
that may be applied to improve prevention, detection, and reaction to attacks 2
( 00 3).
Research honeypots are able to capture extensive forensic data of attacks and the
attack method used by the enemy (Honeypots Net, 200 3). This is essential as "the
greatest challenges the security community faces is lack of information of the
enemy" (Spitzner & Roesch,200 1 , <_[23 ).

The intelligence gathering function of a research honeypot aids to uncover vital
information that may be used to improve network security for organisations (ibid,
200 1 ). The information gathered includes whom the threat is, and thus identifies if
the attacker is a script kiddie, an activist group of hackers, or a single highly skilled
hacker. Knowing who the attacker is may also help the victim determine why they
are attacking. A script kiddie is typically a "bored [and] lonely teenager" (Search
Security, 200 3, <_[2) intending to compromise as many systems as possible using
simple to operate, automated tools (Honeynet Project, 2000 ). An activist group or
skilled hacker may wish to use complex and strategic methods to perform a specific
purpose, such as a political message, on a single organisation (Spitzner,2002 b).

Depending on the skill level of the attacker and their intentions, many methods or
tools may be adopted to execute an attack. A research honeypot is an "excellent tool
for capturing automated attacks" (Spitzner & Roesch, 200 1 , <_[24). As automated
attacks target whole network blocks or blocks of IP addresses, the honeypot will
capture all the attacks and identify evident trails of an automated tool. This may then
be examined to discover how the automated tool was used for exploit.

Attack intelligence gathered through research honeypots, are regarded as a "critical
asset" (ibid,200 1, <_[23). Spitzner and Roesch assert that the ability to identify and
understand an attack is the best method to defeat the attack 2
( 00 1 ). Furthermore,
research honeypots provide the ability to discover and investigate diverse attacks and
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attack methods. This information then becomes vital to the understanding and
improvement of security measures used in organisations.

Risks of honeypots
Risks however may arise if the honeypot is programmed incorrectly often due to
human error. These errors then allow an attacker to compromise the honeypot itself.
The resulting danger is the attacker may gain entry into and damage the protected
network, or use the compromised honeypot to conduct third party attacks. Therefore,
the honeypot should aim to control the attacker within the monitored environment of
the honeypot (Spitzner, 2003).

While a honeypot gains value when it is exploited, if attackers intentionally or
unintentionally circumvent the honeypot, then a compromise in the real system may
not be detected or recorded. Alternatively, attackers may recognise the DTK or other
honeypot signatures through techniques such as OS fingerprinting. Managing system
updates and checking for weaknesses, helps prevent compromise of the honeypot.

"Threats are always adapting and changing - and so will honeypots." (ibid, 2003,
p.111). The revolution of the WWW and technology has fashioned changes in the
new-networked environment. Operational WLANs are growing and hence a
transition from wired deceptive honeypots to wireless deceptive honeypots is widely
anticipated.
2.13.4 Wireless honeypots
The need to deploy wireless honeypots has become apparent due to the recent
popularity of wireless networks (Lemos, 2002). In the article Catching wireless
hackers in the act, Spitzner states "It is important to see how the bad guys are
breaking into systems using not just wired networks, but wireless networks as well"
(2002, <[2). On June 15, 2001, US research and engineering organisation Science
Applications International Corp (SAIC) implemented an operational wireless
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research honeypot designed to investigate wireless attack methods through
observation.

Additionally the Wireless Information Security Experiment (WISE) has deployed an
802. l l b wireless network in an undisclosed location in Washington DC, entirely for
research purposes. The WISE wireless research honeypot employs five Cisco APs, a
small number of computers running vulnerable services for added appeal to hackers,
with two high-gain, omni-directional antennas, for widespread coverage. Network
packets are passively logged on a customised Intrusion Detection System (IDS), in
addition to a back end logging host for traffic generated to and from APs (Poulsen,
2002).

The SAIC wireless honeypot has not revealed any nefarious activity other than single
ping sweeps and unsuccessful attempts to surf the WWW. However, the WISE
wireless honeypot is expected to have Internet connectivity in the near future that
will present a consent-to-monitor banner to allow legal observation of Internet
utilisation via the wireless honeypotted network. As there is no real productive use of
either wireless honeypots other than to research emerging wireless tools and tactics,
all network activity is closely examined (ibid, 2002).

In addition to the same motivations for deploying a research honeypot, a wireless
honeypot will thus enable the security community to investigate the wireless
attacking tools and techniques that are being used by attackers (Schoeneck, 2003).
2.13.5 Legal issues pertaining to honeypots
The arising legal challenges of honeypots could restrain the effective use of these
deceptive defence mechanisms owing to strict regulations of the country the
honeypot is being deployed in (Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000; Spitzner, 2003).
Spitzner (2003) specifies three possible legal issues arising from the deployed use of
honeypots: privacy and entrapment of the attacker, and civil liability of the victim.
The legality of actions may be subject to the nature of the information that is
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collected and what is intended to be done with it, "similarly, what intruders [or
attackers] do while on your honeypot may expose you to certain legal troubles" (ibid,
2003, p.368).

Therefore, certain information about the activities of the unauthorised attacker may
not be captured rightfully by the victim's honeypot and thus unlawful handling or
dissemination of that information may result in an invasion of privacy on the
attacker' s part. Alternatively, an attacker may argue the honeypot to be entrapment,
designed to persuade the attacker to carry out a criminal activity that the attacker
otherwise would not have committed given the honeypot was not deployed.

Equally significant is the concern of the victim's civil liability, should the attacker
launch third party attacks from the victim' s compromised honeypot. Similarly, the
compromised honeypot may be used to store contraband, such as stolen credit card
numbers, or pilfered or prohibited software, which may be difficult if not impossible
to defend against in court.

However, each country's own legal statutes, regulations, and case laws
independently state the legalities of deployed honeypots. Additionally, organisational
policies within regulated industries or governments should provide individual
guidelines and procedures for honeypot deployment whereby violations of internal
policies or breaches of contracts may be handled in isolation.

2.14 Other Integrated Security Mechanisms within Network Security
Honeypots are security solutions that operate as deceptive defence systems. Network
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) and packet sniffers are additional network
security mechanisms. For the purpose of this research, an NIDS will function as a
logging tool that will produce forensic evidence of intrusions and attacks on the
deceptive wireless honeypot.
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Intrusions may be defined as "an unauthorised usage of or misuse of a computer
system" (Ptacek & Newsham, 1998, 12). A network intrusion system (NIDS or IDS)
is a security technology that passively monitors network activity and attempts to
identify and isolate 'intrusions' against computer systems and alert unauthorised
activity (Ptacek & Newsham, 1998; Spitzner, 2003).

Figure 2.5 illustrates a wired network topology in which the attacker typically utilises
the Internet as a means to reach the corporate router and access the internal Ethernet
connection where a corporate end system may be compromised. However, residing
transparently on the corporate Ethernet is also an NIDS network monitor. The NIDS
may be set in a promiscuous mode to collect all packets and is thus passively
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FIGURE 2. 5 Example network topology using a passive monitor
The NIDS operates unobtrusively on the network causing no disruption or
degradation of network performance. Thus, an NIDS is difficult to evade as all
packets traversing the network media are monitored transparently (Ptacek &
Newsham, 1998).
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NIDS' s are able to gather forensic verification of network activity that may identify
the origins of attacks, and may render attackers accountable, or deter them (ibid,
1 998). Identified attacks may be examined at the network packet level through a
process of analysis and verification of protocols, and extracting the relevant
information. An NIDS will also detect known signatures that may signify erroneous
activity or suspicious packet payloads.
Drawbacks of a NIDS are that frequent updated signatures by the system
administrator, are necessary to enable the NIDS to detect malicious packets.
However, new attacks and evasion methods to circumvent NIDS detection, that
contain unidentified signatures, are constantly being developed (Spitzner, 2003).
Additionally, the data collection may appear voluminous. However, this may be
managed through a comprehensive system of data mining.

2.14.1 Packet sniffers
Packet sniffers passively collect and analyse network packets on a wired or wireless
medium. Packet sniffers are transparent to the network, and they do not have alerting
functionality. Many packet sniffers are open source, and therefore differ m
capabilities. SNORT (Caswell & Roesch, 2002) and AirSNORT (Hegerle &
Bruestle, 2002) are common packet sniffers that passively capture network traffic at
the TCP/IP level. This data traffic identifies information such as the source and
destination IP address, MAC address and port number, the time and date, in addition
to the specific protocol used. This information is useful in determining what attacks
are being executed and what they are targeting.

2.15 Review of the Literature on Deception, Honeypots, and 802.llb.
Deception may be expressed as a deliberate and/or fortuitous distortion of a
perceived reality. Evidence suggests that deception forms a major part of biological
existence and thus survival. This was found from the literature of deceptions used by
animals (Bowyer, 1 982; Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000; RAND, 200 1).
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The characteristics of deception may be combined into a framework that
demonstrates a decomposition of deceptive possibilities, encompassing a defensive
or offensive posture. Both defences and offences may implement an actively or
passively executed deception. Additionally, a static, dynamic, adaptive, or
premeditative level of sophistication may implement a masked, misleading, or
confusing effect.

A generalised framework that embraces all the identified deceptive possibilities may
then be applied to any object seeking to implement any of the deceptive effects (see
section 3.2 for framework). Network defences may utilise the same deceptive
characteristics to create a systematic method for deploying a deceptive defence.

Investigation of deceptions may be tested on a wireless honeypot. Honeypots have
demonstrated themselves to be valuable research tools for discovering and
understanding attacking methods. A honeypots primarily uses deception to appear
and perform as a real network. It may emulate OS platforms, services on TCP/IP
ports, application level banners, and whole network topologies, depending on its
configuration.

Contemporary networks may now utilise wireless resources to expand data
communication capabilities. These include the deployment of access points,
antennas, and the use of wireless clients. The common 802.11b standard used
however, has been demonstrated to have several architectural flaws that may allow
compromise of devices utilising the standard.
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Therefore, a wireless honeypot may be deployed to investigate the effectiveness of
deceptive network countermeasures against common network attacks.
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CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research focus questions formulated from the literature review require an
experimental approach to both support propositions, and demonstrate intended or
expected responses. Figure 3.1 demonstrates a hierarchy of research functions that
express a modelled sequence of experimental processes based on Sarantakos' (1998)
and Davis' (1997a) steps of experimental research.

Analysis and
Interpretation
Data Collection
Research Design - Selection of subjects and
arrangement of experimental conditions
rvariablesl
Framework for Methods - relationships between variables,
reliability, and validity
Research Model - Tools to gather empirical evidence [experimental]
Epistemological View - Empiricist and Positivist
Methodology - Use of paradigms [Quantitative and Qualitative methods]

FIGURE 3. 1 Sequence of experimental processes
3.1 .1

Epistemology

At the base of the pyramid is the epistemological stance which are the "views about
one's own knowledge and learning [or] views about the nature of discovery and
knowledge in the scientific community" (Elby & Lising, n.d., 13). According to
Dolhenty (2003), individuals utilise senses and perception to fashion concepts and
ideas that form a reality; and knowledge is attained by the affirmation or denial of an
interpretive judgement about reality. Furthermore Pollock, (cited in Chesnevar,
Maguitman, & Loui, 2000) maintains that epistemology involves the acquisition of
reasons for supporting arguments.
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Knowledge may be defined as the accumulation of a body of facts (Clarke,200 1 ),
and a comparatively abstract description of truth is characterised by judgements
about reality (Dolhenty, 200 3). Thus, the formulation of knowledge and truth
develop the philosophical and conceptual foundations for observing and interpreting
reality, and accordingly characterises the research methodology.

The epistemological views of the researcher agree with the preceding depiction of
reality, and thus consider knowledge and truth to be observable phenomenon that
may be used to draw conclusions. Therefore, this experimental research will be based
on observable outcomes that will answer the research questions:
1.

Can a framework for deception be applied to common network
countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks?

2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot against brute force attacks?
3 . Under what conditions, and do conditions vary b y the type of attack?

3.1.2 Paradigms

There are many epistemological views that draw parallels from several schools of
thought. The epistemic views of empiricism and positivism reinforce the
experimental nature of the research questions. The collected propositions in each
epistemic view including beliefs, values, and techniques (Kuhn, 1 9 70 cited in
Sarantakos, 1 9 9 8 ) form paradigms of established explanations of how the world is
perceived (Sarantakos, 1 9 9 8 ). Thus the epistemological view determines the set of
paradigms employed, and the paradigm in turn should be in context of the
methodology (ibid, 1 9 9 8 ).

3.1.3

,,

Empiricism and positivism

Empirical epistemology relies on the principle that knowledge is derived from
observed or experimental observations (Philosophical Society, n.d.; Trochim,2002).
A positivist view is found on rules and procedures for the observation and
measurement of data (Sarantakos, 1 9 9 8 ). The positive paradigm originates from
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scientific laws that are typically deductive through a process of abstraction to
concretisation, and are explained through universal causal laws (ibid, 1998).

Though there are several branches of positivism, which include logical positivism,
neopositivism, and methodological positivism, a comprehensive depiction of the
positivist paradigm distinguishes reality as:

Everything that can be perceived through the senses . . . is objective,
rests on order, is governed by strict, natural and unchangeable laws,
and can be realised through experience (ibid, 1998, p.36).

Thus, empiricist and positive epistemic views of knowledge and truth advocate
observed and measured actions as a medium for researching scientific hypothesis in
experimental conditions. Furthermore, the positivist paradigm applies formally
defined methods incorporating concepts of measurement, validity, threats to validity
(external, internal, construct, statistical conclusion), and reliability (Thomsen, n.d.)
that are used in a methodological process in the research to establish the cause-and
effect relationships (Davis, 1997b).

Other epistemological views embracing similar philosophies and ideologies from
Philosophical Society (n.d.) include rationalism where reason and intuition are
independent of experience; pragmatism where truth is the subject of experimentation;

'Ill

and conversely, realism views knowledge and truth as attainable attributes from
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experiencing the actual 'form' of the subject in query.

!'l

l' ,I:
1
i

'i

Alternatively, paradigms that deviate from a positivist theoretical direction mainly
involve interpretive or naturalistic values. The interpretivist approach argues that
various factors that are difficult to isolate and control create flawed assumptions,
which result in prejudiced observations. Consequently multiple interpretations of the
same phenomena emerge and truth becomes unattainable (Sarantakos, 1998)
Branches of the interpretivist discipline include phenomenology, ethnography,
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hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, and sociolinguistics and are often adapted to social
research involving human behaviour.

3.1.4 Views adopted by the researcher

The positivist paradigm defends investigation of experimental outcomes as truthful,
and may thus be objectively analysed to derive deductive inferences. Therefore,
positivism will be adopted as the primary view for the experimental research.
Interpretive views will be adopted subsequent to the data collection to allow the
researcher to rationalise conclusions that may be interpreted from the data.

3.1.5

Quantitative and qualitative paradigms

Experimental outcomes of empirical observation and measurement give nse to
further principles pertaining to the data collection and analysis in the form of the
quantitative paradigm. The quantitative paradigm is based on positivist philosophy
where the natural world is governed by fixed laws that are empirically observed
(ibid, 1 998). Quantitative research aims to determine and quantify relationships

between variables through descriptive or experimental methods (Hopkins, 2000).

As the research has been determined as experimental, the quantitative methods
employed will aim to ascertain the relationship between an independent variable (IV)
and dependent variable (DV). The research questions hypothesis that direct
manipulation of the IV - the honeypot, causes the changes in the DV's - the
resulting deceptions; and not other erroneous variables (Davis, 1 997b ). Furthermore,
the experimental research will aim to eliminate alternative variables (ibid, 1 997b).

',1i
i

Studying the relationship between variables involves taking a quantitative
measurement, performing some changes, and taking the measurement again. This
process of iterative intervention is known as repeated measures and will be used in
the experiment to determine the causality of the relationship between the IV and
DV ' s (ibid, 2000). Tools that may be used for interpretation of quantitative,
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statistical data are usually mean, median, mode, frequencies and regression analysis.
Quantitative research then leads to deductive theories.

Upon experimental execution of the IV and DV's, deductions from the outcomes
may then be interpreted. Hence, an associated qualitative paradigm will be fostered
as a supplement to quantitative research. Qualitative analysis involves the discovery
of themes and patterns within the data and is typically exploratory and descriptive.
The qualitative paradigm may also be based on positivistic views that the data is true
given the explicitly stated experimental conditions and limitations.

3.1.6 Methodology
The methodology encompasses the design process and the use of methods which will
both be determined and justified by the principles of empiricism and positivism, and
established through the doctrines of the researcher' s favoured epistemology (Crotty,
1 998). Therefore, the methodology translates guidelines for the research practice
based on paradigmatic assertions about reality.

An empirical investigation is the pnmary data gathering tool arrived through
observation and has been thought arguably to constitute the epistemology for
understanding experience (Willemsen, 1974). Moreover the research strategy for
empirical observation typically employs correlational, field-descriptive (applying
correlation methods), or experimental techniques summarised in brief from (Huck &
Cormier, 1 996; Willemsen, 1 974).

Correlational investigation
Correlational investigation measures variables against pre-existing traits in order to
ascertain relationships between variables, drawing its distinction from measuring
variables that are caused by manipulation of the researcher. Correlational studies
determine the existence of a relationship and the nature of that relationship by
examining both the variables simultaneously in addition to the strength of the
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relationship. Correlations may be established as a high-high, low-low case; a high
low, low-high case; or with little systematic tendency.

Field studies
Field studies utilise settings where "behaviours of interest naturally occur"
(Willemsen, 1 974, p.34), given a laboratory environment may be too artificial and
stifle 'normal' , or 'typical' activity. A field study researcher would elect a
complementary landscape for the study and consider a narrative description and
interpretation of the setting and circumstances.

Experimental studies
Using experimental strategies the researcher isolates, manipulates, and controls
variables relating to behaviours or experience pertaining to the researched
phenomena.

3.1. 7

Research method used for the conduct of research

Empirical observation may engage a combination of the above research strategies to
optimise results for conducting the research, and as a process of operationalising the
research questions.

Thus the research methodology for this research will predominantly encompass
experimental strategies as the principal implementation of empirical and positivist
epistemology, and through the observation and measurement of regulated variables.

:il'

, 'I'1
1 ·'

Therefore the independent variable (IV) controlled by the researcher will be tested
with dependent variables (DV), that are products of the direct manipulation of the IV.

A correlational investigation will ascertain the presence of relationships between
variables so that a cause-effect association may be tested to verify results. A field
study on the other hand will offset the artificial composition of the experiment by
allowing the researcher to assimilate an archetypal environment to execute the

'1
'I
t
;
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experiment. This is because a completely contained wireless network environment
would be unachievable by the researcher.

An underlying positivist paradigm will then direct the structure and process of the
framework of methods within the experimental implementation.

3.1.8 Framework for methods
Research methods are the tools or instruments of data generation and analysis that
are employed to accumulate empirical evidence, and are invoked from the
underpinning precepts of the major elements of the methodology (Crotty, 1 998;
Sarantakos, 1 998). Hence empirical and positivist, experimental methods are
designed in a specifically defined and detailed framework.

3.2 Framework for Deception
The empirical nature of the research will utilise the anecdotal investigations of
deceptive origins and implementation as the experimental variables to conceive a
framework for the research. Thus, the conceptual framework for methods will be the
foundation of the experiment, and applying the established methodologies formerly
described will answer the research focus questions:

1:

1 . Can a framework for deception be applied to common network
countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks?
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot against brute force attacks?
3 . Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by the type o f attack?

Therefore, collating the deceptive characteristics suggested in the literature, a
framework for deception may be constructed to encompass all the previous
mentioned categories of deception examined in the form of an attack tree (Schneier,
2000).

51

' '.

i
:1

i'

APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION

SUENYEK

The framework for deception is the conceptual basis from which to implement the
research design of the testable experimental conditions. The framework will also be
used to identify the mapping of network countermeasures and attacks to deceptions
that will be deployed on the wireless honeypot.

The research design (see chapter 4) will depict how each experimental variable will
be mapped to a type of deception from the framework. The experimental
implementation will identify the type of deceptions (DV's) to be deployed as a
network countermeasure or attack; and the outcomes of deceptions on the wireless
honeypot (IV). Therefore the following arrangement and execution of the
experimental variables will guide the execution of the experiment (Sarantakos,
1 998).

Figure 3 .2 characterises the framework for deception from an offensive or defensive
stance for a single deception. Both account for active and passive states that may
implement a static, dynamic, adaptive, or premeditative level of sophistication and
resulting in a masked, misleading, or confusing effect. A single deception may
assimilate one or many deceptive pathways.
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OFFENSIVE OR
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DECEPTION
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I

Mask,
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Mislead or
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I
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Mask,
Mislead or
Confuse

I I

Mask,
Mislead or
Confuse

Static

I

Mask,
Mislead or
Confuse

I

Dynamic

Adaptive

Mask,
Mislead or
Confuse

Mask,
Mislead or
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Premeditative

I

Mask,
Mislead or
Confuse

FIGURE 3. 2 Framework for deception
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4

CHAPTER 4 - RESEARCH DESIGN

The aim of the research is to measure the outcomes of deceptive capabilities against
brute force attacks so that results may be examined using a systematic approach that
either supports or nullifies arguments pertaining to the research questions:
1. Can a framework for deception be applied to common network
countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks?
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot against brute force attacks?
3. Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by the type of attack?

Upon definition of the underlying methodology for the research questions, a research
design may be devised. The research design will encompass two major phases. The
first will describe the logical and technical implementations of the hardware and
software used in the experiment. The second phase will define each experimental
variable in varying deceptive conditions thus describing how they may be deployed
in the wireless honeypot.

This research involves constructing and deploying an integrated wired and wireless
honeypot utilising deceptive mechanisms that encompasses a fake access point,
Honeyd and the Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The deceptive wireless honeypot
will be deployed in the form of deception in depth.

4.1 Logical and Technical Implementation

4.1.1 Logical structure of the deployed deceptive wireless honeypot
Figure 4.1 illustrates the logical deployment of the deceptive wireless honeypot
through the rings of deception in depth. A fake access point utilising FakeAP is
situated on the peripheral as ring 3 as it is the most static and transparent of the
deceptions. The Honeyd virtual networks encircle the honeypot asset within the
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second ring of the deception given that Honeyd implements variable network level
deception that will sustain the majority of the deceptive network attacks. The
honeypot asset is located centrally (ring 1 ) where only strategically targeted
deceptive attacks will be able to penetrate.

The Honeyd logs and SNORT (Caswell & Roesch, 2002) Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) will form the central logging structure (CLS). The aim of the CLS will be to
log and record all wireless traffic to the honeypot to verify the results of the attack
tools used. This will detect network activity such as scans and probes from the
attacking machine; however, from the victim' s perspective.

FIGURE 4. 1 Applying the wireless honeypot to deception in depth
4.1.2 Ring 3 FakeAP
Access points are used as gateways to bridge to the private wireless network. There
may be several configurations for an access point depending on the role of the AP
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gateway within the network. FakeAP is software that may be used to simulate many
access points.

APs transmit 802 . 1 1 b data packets containing the IP of the access point gateway,
configurations, and possible information about the connecting wireless network.
Thus, an AP is often sniffed by an attacker to gain further access to exploit network
resources situated behind the AP (Spitzner & Roesch, 200 1 ).

FakeAP changes configurable parameters through the command iwconfig. The
behaviour, signal strength, and data contained in beaconed packets are dependent on
the configuration of iwconfig parameters. Hence, the way in which FakeAP is set up
will determine the strength of the ring 3 deception.

The synopsis for the iwconfig interface in Linux appears below (Tourrilhes, 1 996).
Table 4. 1 identifies and describes the function of each of the iwconfig parameters
that will be utilised in the deceptive wireless honeypot.

SYNOPSIS
iwconfig [ interface ]
iwconfig interface [essid X]

[nwid N]

[ channel C ]

[ sens S ]

[ ap A] [nick N]
[frag FT ]
[key K]

[ freq F]
[mode M]

[ rate R]

[ txpower T ]

[power P]

[rts RT]

[enc E ]

[ retry R ]

[ commit]

i'
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Name of AP - "WinNT4
Domain identifier or network name
assigned as the name of the AP, which Web AP"
also specifies the cells that are part of
the same virtual network
Creates logical wireless networks that
are used to differentiate and identify
nodes that belon to the same cell

"WinNT4 Web AP"

Frequency is set in GHz and the
channel is a number. Regulations
control the number of channels
available and usable frequencies.

802. 1 1 b wireless default is
2.4GHz.

Sensitivity threshold for the lowest
signal level to attempt packet
reception and used to avoid
background noise measured in dBm

The lowest threshold for
which the channel is not
considered busy and the
handover threshold
maintaining association
with the access point 80dBm

Operating mode of the device
depending on network topology:

Managed mode will reflect
the virtual networks
created by honeyd

•

Ad-hoc - 1 cell & 1 AP

•

Managed - many cells roam
with many APs

•

Master - node acts as AP

•

Repeater - node forwards
ackets

The channel will switch
between numbers 1 - 1 1

Forces the card to pre-register with the Will be set to "true"
AP. when connection is too low
wireless cards will attempt to connect
to the strongest signals beaconed from
an AP
The speed at which bits are
transmitted over the medium used for
cards that su ort multi le bit rates

1 1 Mb

TABLE 4. 1 FakeAP parameters used for the wireless honeypot
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Proposed attacks on ring 3
The role of the ring 3 deception is to produce an access point gateway for attackers to
discover ingress to the private wireless network via the IP of the FakeAP. Wireless
sniffing tools such as Kismet (Kershaw, 2003), and Netstumbler (Milner, 2002)
identify the presence of APs, and any AP related parameters that are instructed by

iwconfig. Subsequently, the attacker advances to the next level of deception, which
are the virtual wired and wireless networks within Honeyd.

4.1.3 Ring 2 Honeyd
The Honeyd is configured to appear as a wired network containing web servers and
client workstations that bridge added wireless services. Figure 4.2 illustrates the
course of logical network routes deployed through the Honeyd virtual networks. A
router typically interfaces outside Internet connections with the internal network that
is segmented to form various operating environments

Honeyd aims to ascertain the attacker' s objectives and resources by mimicking
legitimate services via direct manipulation of the network stack of the designated
operating system (OS). Therefore, the configurations for Honeyd involve
reproducing the TCP/IP handshake sequence for OS matches, packet latency, packet
loss and traceroute functions with the intention of appearing realistic. Table 4.2
outlines the technical implementation of each of the selected Honeyd operating
platforms for the deceptive wireless honeypot.

Proposed attacks on ring 2
When an intruder ascertains the IP address of the AP gateway, further probing will
identify network IP addresses that are really the Honeyd virtual networks. Each
wired and wireless network topology emulates an operating system "personality"
(Provos, 2003) that is allocated through the researcher' s preference. However, each
selected OS personality must be a precise match of an NMAP or Xprobe prescribed
OS signature for the reason that Honeyd functions by simulating connections made at
the network level (TCP, IP, UDP, and ICMP).

58

L

SUENYEK

APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION

Honeyd was designed to only provide network level interaction due to combat
popular network security scanning tools such as NMAP (Conry-Murray, 200 1 ;
Fratto, 2003; Noordergraaf, 2002) that utilises TCP/IP handshakes at the network
level, to administer connections. NMAP enumerates network information such as the
OS type and version, opened or blocked TCP/IP ports, in addition to active services
(Fyodor, 2003a). Thus, relayed packets from the network level give substantive
information that denotes consequent OS vulnerabilities and possible exploitive
opportunities for the attacker.
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Workstation

G

Workstation

AIX Server
1 0.3

Novell Server
1 0. 3. 1 . 1 8

Workstation

FREE BSD Serve.�1 0.3. 1 . 1 6

•

CISCO H b/Switch
10.3 1 . 1 2

Wireless
Client

Wireless
Client

Workstation
Workstation

Win NT4
AP Bridge

�
Workstation

Win 98
Workstation

•

SOLARIS Server
1 0.3. 1 . 1 7

Win 98
Workstation

FIGURE 4. 2 Logical configuration of the Honeyd virtual networks
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3com Office Connect Router
810

10.3.1. 1.1

TCP 80 - HTTP

reset

TCP 1 39 - NetBIOS

Set default UDP action
reset

TCP 137 - NetBIOS-ns
UDP 137 - NetBIOS-ns

Set router uid 32767 gid
32767

UDP 135 - MS Exchange
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS
11.2

10.3.1.12

FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE

10.3.1.13
10.3.1. 1 4

Telnet

No ports open

Set default TCP action
reset

No ports open
TCP 25 - SMTP
TCP 80 - HTTP

Web

TCP 21 - FTP

FTP

Set default TCP action
reset

FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE

10.3.1. 1 5

TCP 80 - HTTP

Web

Set default TCP action
reset

FreeBSD 2. 7/SPARC or NFR
IDS Appliance

1 0.3.1.16

TCP 80 - HTTP

Web

Set default TCP action
reset

10.3.1.17

TCP 80 - HTTP

Web

Set default TCP action
reset
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Novell Netware 3.12 -5.0 0

10 .3.1.1 8

TCP 80 - HTTP

Web

Set default TCP action
reset

FreeBSD2.2.1 -STABLE

10 .3.1.1 9

TCP 80 -HTTP

Web

Set default TCP action
reset

FreeBSD2.2.1 -STABLE

10 .3.1.1 9

TCP 80 - HTTP

Web

Set default TCP action
reset

Cisco Router/Switch with IOS
11.2

10 .3.1.20

Telnet

Set default UDP action
reset

10 .3.1.200

TCP23 - TELNET
No ports open

TABLE 4. 2 Honeyd technical configuration
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4.1.4

Ring 1 honeypot asset

The honeypot itself is a Linux Mandrake 9.0 machine that runs all the deceptive
services that are required for the rings of deception in depth, in the wireless
honeypot. The honeypot is the most protected ring, as the outer rings of deception
cannot function without the operational core. Therefore, the honeypot deception
encompasses the deceptions deployed through rings 2 and 3 .

Proposed attacks on ring 1
Attacking the honeypot itself requires targeted buffer overflows on OS flaws, or
vulnerabilities revealed from the penetration testing on ring 2 of the deception.
Buffer overflows or "smashing the stack" (McClure, Scambray, & Kurtz, 200 1 ,
p. 1 61 ) refers to an attack that attempts to overwhelm the virtual memory with more
input than the buffer stack may contain.

Buffer overflow attacks are an increasing danger (Aleph One, n.d.; Cowan, Wagle, &
Pu, 1 999; Grover, 2003; McClure et al., 2001 ), and "represent one of the most
serious classes [of] security threats" (Cowan et al., 1 999, p. 1 ) in relation to network
penetration. A successfully executed buffer overflow can cause system crashes and
core dumps that may consequently allow the intruder to inject attack or malicious
instructions into the system and network (ibid, 1 999).

4.1 .5

Central logging structure

The central logging structure encompasses an IDS namely SNORT (Caswell &
Roesch, 2002) packet sniffer, that will serve in cooperation with the Honeyd logs to
passively record all system traffic. The network data collected will confirm network
penetration and buffer overflow success through captured and dissected data that
include the source and destination: IP address, MAC address, TCP/IP ports, and the
protocols used, as well as any buffer outputs.

63

L

SUEN YEK

APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION

4.2 Experimental Variables

Each ring in the deception in depth draws on deceptive countermeasures, and each
ring is targeted by anticipated deceptive network attacks. This describes the testable
conditions for investigating deceptions used on the wireless honeypot. The
arrangement of the experimental conditions thus guides the execution of the
experiment (Sarantakos, 1 9 9 8 ).
The following is a description of the experimental variables. The variables will be
implemented to provide quantitative measurement of a causal or correlated
relationship between the IV and DV's.
:i

:.J! · ,}

The independent variable

:1·

,

The independent variable (IV) is the deployed deceptive wireless honeypot and has
conditions that are manipulated by the researcher as the causal object within the
correlated relationship (Davis, 1 9 9 7b ). Quantitative measurements will be used for
initial testing of the IV. The researcher will then manipulate the IV and perform a
second round of quantitative measurements. This will also be used to identify any
changes that may occur.

4

1:

')

,�..

�I '

The dependent variable (DV) is the effect, or the result of the manipulated IV (ibid,
1 9 9 7 b) which will be the different types of deceptions deployed. This will determine
and quantify the strength of the correlated relationship, if any. The DV's will be
defined in the research design as a matrix (see sections 52
. . 1 and 5 .3 . 1 ).

Alternate variables

Alternate variables which may effect the outcomes of the experiment should be
controlled or eliminated in order to support argument that the true cause of the
measured outcomes are by result of the IV and not by any deviating variables that are

64

\

�1'. '

t: :
; i, 1

'1 , ·1.

�
I

The dependent variable

i

1

,1

(
....1

L

APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION

SUENYEK

not considered as part of the experiment (ibid, 1 9 9 7 a). Alternate variables will be
considered in the research resign in descriptive tables of how the DV' s are deployed
on the IV (see sections 52
. .1 and 5.3. 1 ).

Control variables involve settings, configurations, and limitations of the tools and

software used within the experiment that may alter the outcomes of the DV and
involve deceptions that are not part of the intended condition of the IV. Control
variables should be held constant by the researcher so they do not influence the
results (ibid, 1 9 9 7 b). However, due to the often-volatile nature of software, some
control variables such as a one-off glitch, will be unavoidable. Therefore, they will
be considered as a limitation of the research and will be addressed in the results (see
chapters6 and 7 ) and discussion (see chapter 8 ).

Random variables

Random variables are other variables that may be potential causes (ibid, 1 9 9 7b) and
not the IV. This may include weather, interfering noise, inaccurate machine
responses, or bugs in software. Eliminating such random variables involves
anticipation and timely preparation. Repeated testing to compare the consistency of
results of the experimental testing will aid reliability of results.

Confounding variables

Confounding variables are variables that may alter the IV and may result as the
cause instead of the intended IV (ibid, 1 9 9 7 b). Therefore, confounding variables of
the deceptive wireless honeypot are unintended fluctuations of conditions on the IV,
which may be a result in software errors or inaccurate configurations by the
experimenter. Repeated tests should identify such errors for elimination. This should
be identified during the experimentation, and addressed in the results section (see
chapters6 and 7).
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5

CHAPTER 5 - DECEPTIVE COUNTERMEASURES AND
ATTACK IMPLEMENTATION

The chief goal of the experiment is to implement a composition of deceptions that
simulate a real 802.1 1 b wireless integrated network to test the deceptive
countermeasures against common network attacks. Utilising the identified technical
and logical configurations of FakeAP and Honeyd, a coherent network using
deceptive mechanisms may be deployed as a series of rings in deception in depth.

A constructed matrix of deceptive countermeasures and attacks expresses a
diagrammatic implementation of the experimental conditions for testing the nature of
the relationship between deceptive defences of the wireless honeypot, and the

,·

."I

potential outcomes of deceptive attacks.

,,'

·1

I

1;

Thus, the framework for deception illustrates the theoretical dissection of deceptive
categories and characteristics gathered from biological and military case study. The
matrices also demonstrate implementation of those conceptual deceptions through
testable conditions. The wireless honeypot will be the independent variable (IV) to
be manipulated in the experiment, and the deceptive conditions identified in the
matrices are the dependent variables (DV's).
i
. :1

5.1 Applying the Framework for Deception to a Matrix

The network countermeasures and attacks are categorised through the same levels of
deception identified in the framework. Deceptive defences and deceptive offences
are described independently as two matrices for each countermeasure and attack. The
remaining deceptive categorisations are maintained in each matrix. This includes an
active or passive state, followed by a static, dynamic, adaptive, or premeditative
approach to implementing a masked, misleading, or confusing deceptive effect.

66

·

�
:

I

1

ii

APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION

5.2

SUENYEK

Deceptive Network Countermeasures

Table 5.1 is the matrix of deceptive Defence Network Countermeasures (DNC) to be
deployed on the wireless honeypot. The DNC encompasses deceptions employed on
the Honeyd virtual networks and the CLS (Honeyd logs and IDS). Each defence
strategy is reactive, and thus only executed after the attacking machine has initiated a
probe or scan on the targeted wireless honeypot.

Table 5.2 is the matrix of deceptive Offence Network Countermeasures (ONC).
FakeAP beacons are the only ONC that will be deployed on the wireless honeypot. It
is an offensive deception as it is activated regardless of an attacker executing any
probes or scans.

5.2.1 Application of the matrices of deceptive countermeasures
The deceptive DNC and ONC in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are security strategies that aim to
strengthen the wireless honeypot by employing the deceptive characteristics that
were mapped from the framework for deception.

Table 5.3 presents a detailed description of the conditions for deploying each
deceptive countermeasure against the wireless honeypot. This will also entail
explanations of the dependent variables (DV) of the experiment; with consideration
of any random variables. The experimental conditions involve:
•

Identifying the ring of the deception in depth the countermeasure applies to

•

The deceptive effect sought as denoted on the matrix

•

An explained function of how the deception is performed

•

Random variables that may interfere or alter the intended experimental
conditions

•

The method to overcome the random variables
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TABLE 5. 1 Matrix of deceptive DNC

+

TABLE 5. 2 Matrix of deceptive ONC

t = mask, camouflage, repackage;

= mimic, mislead, decoy;
68

? = confuse, dazzle, invent;
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Mimic

OS appears as a real
platform on an OS
fin e rint

OS TCP/IP fingerprint
does not match an OS
latform

OS personality must match a
prescribed NMAP or Xprobe
si ature

Mimic

Appears as a true OS
flaw that may be
exploited

The flaw cannot be
exploitable through a
buffer overflow

Test each OS with Nessus for
vulnerabilities, if no vulnerabilities
occur, then change the OS as it is
not dece tive

Mislead

The intruder believes an
exploitable vulnerability
exists

The vulnerability does
not match the OS

Test the vulnerabilities by
directing a targeted buffer
overflow to that OS flaw

Mislead

Appears as a network of
systems and not as a
standalone com uter

Incompatible platforms
on the same network

Conduct Nessus tests to check
accurate configuration of networks
in honeyd

Mimic

Routes packets through
the networks

Packet latency does not
match the network
topolo y

Test packet latency through
NMAP scans

Mislead

Intruder believes the
TCP/IP stack is matches
the TCP/IP stack of the
OS

NMAP TCP/IP stack
cannot perform
handshakes with the
TCP/IP stack of the
scanned machine

Test NMAP scans and change the
OS fingerprint until NMAP picks
up the correct OS match.

Mimic

The stack acts the same
as a real TCP/IP stack

Possible errors in
software

Conduct several NMAP tests to
ensure reliability
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2

Mislead

TCP/IP fingerprint gives
the guessed OS of the
machine

2

Mislead

OS may still be probed
Intruder believes the
machine has been crashed after an alleged buffer
and the system is down
overflow hit

2

Mimic

Machine responds with a
buffer overflow upon
attack

The buffer overflow does
not crash or core dump
the system as it should

Change the OS fingerprint where
the buffer overflow response is
accurate.

2

Mimic

Services appear available
for each OS

Mismatched services for
OS platforms

Nessus and NMAP tests will
identify services available, if they
are not intended; they may be
eliminated or changed to match
the OS

2

Mimic

Scripts appear as a
typical banner upon
scanning of the OS.

The banner does not
match the OS or the
service.

Test Nessus and NMAP scans to
view all banner scripts that appear
and if they are accurately matched
to the OS and service.

2

Mislead

Intruder believes the
banner distinguishes the
OS type and version.

The OS banner message
is inappropriate or does
not match the OS.

Conduct Nessus tests to ensure all
banners are appropriate and
correct and eliminate those that are
inapt.

Camouflage

Passively gathers the
honeyd logs without
knowled e of the

Intruder is able to
compromise the honeyd
and ain access to the

Encrypt log files an save on a
separate machine

1
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TCP/IP fingerprint gives
an incorrect guess of the
OS

Test NMAP scans and change the
OS fingerprint until NMAP picks
u the correct OS match
Test buffer overflow attacks
against Honeyd and change the OS
if it may still be probed after an
attack
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intruder.

lo s.

1

Camouflage

Passively logs all
Intruder is able to
wireless network activity compromise the IDS and
without knowledge of the gain access to the logs.
intruder.

3

Mislead

Beaconing a faked SSID,
MAC and IP.

Other legitimate APs that Test other APs in the coverage
area for their SSID, MAC and IPs,
beacon the same SSID,
MAC or IP.
and ensure the FakeAP is
different.

3

Mimic

Appears as an existing
AP.

Beacons incorrect MAC
address.

Ensure the MAC address matches
the intended Cisco vendor' s first 6
hex digits.

3

Decoy

Captures attention from
existing APs.

AP beacons are not
picked up by wireless
sniffers.

Test AP beacons and strength at
various lengths.

3

Dazzle

Set the AP to flick
through different MAC
addresses and appear as
many APs.

The IP of the flicking
APs does not change.

This will limit the deception
depending on the sniffing tool
used, as some will only give the
MAC and others also give the IP.

TABLE S. 3 Experimental conditions for deceptive DNC and ONC
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In Table 5.3 varying experimental conditions are described that will be deployed on
the wireless honeypot. This will allow investigation of what conditions and how
conditions vary by the type of attacks that will be launched against the deceptive
network countermeasures.

5.3 Deceptive Network Attacks
Table 5 .4 is the matrix of deceptive Network Defence Attacks (NDA) that will be
carried out against the wireless honeypot. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
poisoning, IP spoofing and MAC spoofing are methods of attack that deceptively
conceal the real identity of the attacker with a faked identity. These defence attacks
are used as a preliminary technique for ingress to the network (which in this case is
the Honeyd virtual networks) to then execute offensive deceptive attacks.

'"I'

Table 5.5 is the matrix of deceptive Network Offensive Attacks (NOA) that will be
launched against the wireless honeypot. Offensive attacks may be brute forced such
as continuous hits resulting in buffer overflows and other variants of Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks. Other attacks such as NMAP and Nessus scans seek to
interact with the victim to collect useful OS configuration and vulnerability
information. Brute force attacks are frequently active because they are aimed to take
out the victim.
A stealth attack such as a man-in-the-middle that initiates a single masked hit
triggering a DoS, or breaking a wireless connection, is also active. A passive attack
such as packet sniffing aims to inconspicuously intercept and capture data that is
retained by the attacker. Packets will show data that include the network
configurations that the attacker will use to tailor an active attack.
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TABLE 5. 4 Matrix of deceptive DNA

TABLE 5. 5 Matrix of deceptive ONA

t = mask, camouflage, repackage;

+

= mimic, mislead, decoy;
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? = confuse, dazzle, invent;
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5.3.1

Application of the matrices of deceptive attacks

The matrices of deceptive DNA and ONA identified in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are attack
strategies that may be launched against the deceptive countermeasures on the
wireless honeypot. Consequently, experimental conditions for deploying brute force
attacks may be coordinated to test the effectiveness of deceptions used to defend the
wireless honeypot.

Table 5.6 presents the experimental conditions for potential attacks derived from the
matrices of deceptive attacks (Tables 5.4 and 5.5) that may be performed against the
wireless honeypot. The experimental conditions that may be tested are demonstrated
through:
•

The deception in depth ring given for each attack, identifying the ring of the
defence the attack is targeted to

•

The distinguished brute force network attacks from stealth attacks

•

Description of the function of the attacking deception in order to achieve the
deceptive effect sought
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Deceive ARP to believe the
attacker has a legitimate MAC.

Gain access to honeypot' s ARP table and
assume one of the MAC addresses or
insert a false MAC.

./

Camouflage

Appearing as a legitimate IP
address

Use downloadable tools to spoof the IP
of the attacker.

./

Camouflage

Appearing as a legitimate MAC
address that may connect to the
AP.

Ascertain permissible MAC addresses
from an ARP table, or obtain MAC
address from packet headers travelling
the rivate network.

./

Dazzle

Overwhelm the memory stack of Exploiting a discovered flaw in the OS
the target.
and targeting an excessive number of
ackets to dazzle and crash the OS.

./

Camouflage

Intercept the connection without
being detected .

Knock out the AP connection in a single
concealed attack.

./

Dazzle

Send overwhelming numbers of
I CMP packets.

Directing continuos ICMP packets or
ICMP type floods to specific OS to cause
a crash .

./

Dazzle

Hit the OS with an unexpected
soli
strike.

Send a single hit to cause the OS to
crash.

./

Mask

Inconspicuously sniff AP
broadcast beacons.

Sniff packets to identify the AP MAC, IP
and other confi urations to tailor attacks.

TABLE 5. 6 Experimental conditions for DNA and ONA
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5.4 Research Design of the Framework and Matrices
The research design of the framework and the matrices indicated that the active
countermeasures should be implemented before the passive countermeasures. This is
because the wireless honeypot must be proactively secured before enabling the
correct deceptive response. Passive attacks will be initiated before active attacks to
identify to the attacker, how to implement deceptive attacks against the victim.

This presents a method for carrying out the experimental brute force and stealth
attacks against the wireless honeypot. Additionally, the effectiveness of deceptions
will be observed to discover if conditions vary by the type of attack and under what
conditions.

Thus, the wireless honeypot may be deployed following the deceptive network
countermeasures identified in the DNC and ONC. Investigating the effectiveness of
the deceptions on the wireless honeypot will be done through executing the deceptive
network attacks identified in the DNA and ONA. This will enable the researcher to
evaluate if the framework for deception may be applied to reduce the effectiveness of
attacks, and the effectiveness of the wireless honeypot against brute force attacks.
Additionally, the conditions identified in Tables 5.3 and 5.6 will be deployed to
identify what conditions may vary by the type of attack.
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CHAPTER 6 - ROUND 1 RESULTS

6.1 Baseline Testing
Round 1 testing involved a baseline test to determine if the wireless honeypot was
able to be scanned or attacked with the given honeypot configurations and
architecture. This was also to confirm if FakeAP and Honeyd were able to run
concurrently.

The attacking machine utilised Linux Mandrake 9.0 with dual boot Windows XP to
allow the attacker to utilise various attacking tools for both OS platforms. The attack
machine was also equipped with a wireless PCMCIA card. The following wireless
security tools were installed:
• Kismet
• Netstumbler
• NMAP

I .

• Nessus

An attacker would typically use such tools, as they are free to download from the
World Wide Web (WWW) and require little understanding of the technical
functionality. The tools used for attacks against the wireless honeypot may be
installed and used on a Linux or Windows machine.

6.2 Ring 1 FakeAP
Round 1 of testing involved FakeAP at the outer ring of the deception in depth for
the wireless honeypot. Attacks identified in the matrix of deceptive attacks included
the wireless sniffing tools for determining the existence of APs and their related
configurations.
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6.2.1

Kismet

Kismet is a wireless sniffing tool that was installed on the attacking machine. Kismet
was able to pick up the beaconed 802.11b packets from a bogus access point, and
identified the following information:
•

The SSID of the bogus AP as "WinNT AP"

•

The channel of the WinNT AP used which was channel 4

•

The IP address of the WinNT AP as 192.168.1.99 which consequently
informs the attacker of the gateway IP address

6.2.2

Netstumbler

Netstumbler is a wireless sniffing tool for Windows platforms, and was also used to
verify the information sniffed by Kismet. Netstumbler was able to enumerate the
following information on the rogue AP:
•

The SSID as of the rogue AP as "WinNT AP"

•

The MAC address of WinNT AP and recognised the vendor as Cisco

•

The channel of the WinNT AP as channel 4

6.3

Implications of FakeAP testing

Testing in Round 1 FakeAP demonstrated that attacking tools Kismet and
Netstumbler were able to sniff out the rogue AP. The attacking machine was able to
identify information about the AP including an IP address of the AP gateway, and the
SSID of the wireless network. The attacker could then reconfigure and spoof the IP
of the attacking machine so that the attacking machine's IP may be on the same
network as the rogue AP's. Subsequently the attacking machine's IP was changed to
192.168.1.253 so that the attacking machine could then conduct further probing of
network resources through the AP gateway of 192.168.1.99.
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Ring 2 Honeyd

Testing ring 2 of the deception in depth followed from ring 1 , FakeAP testing.
Therefore, the next level of attack encompassed stealth and brute force scans and
probes of the private network, which were the Honeyd virtual networks. The goal of
the Round 1 testing on ring 2, was also a baseline test to investigate if attacking tools
NMAP and Nessus would be deceived by the deceptions deployed on the wireless
honeypot, through Honeyd.

Two network scanning tools typically used by a script kiddie are NMAP and Nessus
(Conry-Murray, 200 1 ; Fratto, 2003 ; Noordergraaf, 2002) and were subsequently the
attacking tools selected for network attacks on ring 2 of the wireless honeypot. The
testing incorporated assessment of the outputs and reports generated from the attack
tools.

A naYve attacker such as a script kiddie would use NMAP stealth scans by selecting a
block of IP addresses to scan the network. NMAP then return results informing the
attacker of the OS and platform that it believes is running on the IP address, and any
interesting ports that should be noted; such as TCP port 23 (telnet) - open. An
attacker could then be well informed on what OS's are on selected IP' s and enter
those IP's into Nessus for brute force scanning and probing.

Nessus will forcefully scan each IP address selected by the attacker and probe every
specified port. Nessus then generates a report that details the OS and security
information including security warnings such as banners, and vulnerabilities or holes
that identify a dangerous threat exposure of a specific service or a TCP/IP port.

The deceptive capability of ring 2 testing was determined by how well NMAP and
Nessus could be fooled into believing an OS existed, and if any security
vulnerabilities existed on the OS.
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6.4.1

Round 1 NMAP testing

NMAP (Fyodor, 2003b) scans networks for live hosts and offered services through
the known sequence of TCP/IP handshakes of various OS's. Therefore, NMAP uses
a method of OS fingerprinting to identify the networks of wired and wireless services
that were associated with Honeyd. Table 6. 1 describes the functions of the different
NMAP scans (Fyodor, 200 1) that were used to perform the NMAP OS fingerprinting
on the Honeyd.

NMAP sends a SYN packet to half open a
TCP connection, if the response is a
SYN/ACK a RST will be sent to abandon the
connection. This type of SYN technique is
rarel lo ed.
TCP connect

TCP connections are attempted on all ports of
a tar et machine.
Determines which UDP ports are open when
there is no ICMP ort unreachable messa e.
Advanced stealth scans
Closed ports reply with a RST
Open ports ignore the packet
Will not work on a Windows machine hence identifying that the target machine is
most likely a Windows OS.
Uses TCP/IP handshakes to make an OS
'fingerprint' and checks it against the NMAP
OS fin e rint file.
Splits the TCP header over more smaller
ackets as an attem ts to evade detection.

TABLE 6. 1 NMAP v.3 scan types
SYN scans
A SYN scan was conducted on each IP address to determine if the Honeyd would
deceptively respond by detecting the half-open connections and discarding them.
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SYN scans, in combination with OS detection (-0), and fragmented packets (-F)
would typically be used by the attacker to determine the OS of the machine, ports
that are listening, and services running while evading detection by the target
machine. The outcome of the scan may reveals if the attacker is fooled by the NMAP
result returning a successful OS match.

UDP scans
UDP scans with OS detection and fragment determine which UDP ports are open,
and are potential ports for placing a Troj an, or backdoor such as bo2k to listen on.
An attacker would believe an open UDP port could be vulnerable and exploit the
possibility of injecting malicious software. Therefore, NMAP, UDP scans attempts to
identify which OS's would potentially be vulnerable to these types of attacks.

FIN, XMAS, and NULL scans
FIN, XMAS, and NULL scans attempt a further clandestine approach to port
scanning and OS detection. Due to the technical configurations of Windows
machines, these scans usually do not work. However, a failed scan may deceptively
be construed by the attacker as a possible Windows 95 or 98 machine.

The aim of the NMAP scans was to determine if Honeyd could deceptively mislead
NMAP into believing there were ports and services belonging to an OS of a machine.
Subsequently an attacker using NMAP may also be deceived. This information
would then be used to tailor an attack to the specified OS.
Table 6.2 shows the results of Round 1 of the NMAP scans that were conducted as a
baseline test to ensure the machine could be probed wirelessly. The researcher chose
IP addresses with no significance to the logical network topology and assigned them
one of nine NMAP prescribed OS signatures, only to establish if the Honeyd virtual
networks could be reached via a wireless NMAP scan. 1 0.3 . 1 . 1 5, 1 0.3. 1 . 1 9 and
1 0.3.1 .20 were unallocated IP address spaces which the researcher also performed
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NMAP scans on to observe if the default OS assigned by ARPD, would also be
detected.

The default OS was FreeBSD and was randomly selected to test if ARPD was able to
pick up which IP addresses did not have a prescribed OS bound to the IP, and would
automatically allocate the default. This formed part of the baseline testing of Round
1.

Three scans were conducted for each NMAP scan type, and on each IP address to
check the reliability of results on each scan. It was found there were some software
bugs in NMAP and Honeyd which created some inconsistencies, thus a fourth scan
was conducted for the SYN and XMAS scans. Honeyd crashed on the second test for
XMAS scans for an unknown reason, most likely due to a one-off software
malfunction. Therefore, Honeyd was restarted and an extra XMAS scan was
performed.

SYN scans
SYN scans were the most effective at guessing the correct remote OS. The Cisco
router and hub OS's, Novell, AIX, and OpenBSD could all be successfully detected
on all four SYN scans conducted. NMAP however, could not detect Solaris on any
SYN scans, indicating a possible error in the Honeyd configuration file, or an
unmatching NMAP fingerprint in the NMAP fingerprint file. Further results showed
the NMAP OS guess for Cisco Aironet AP defaulted to FreeBSD on two SYN scans,
and then crashed for the succeeding two SYN scans.

SYN scans performed on the Default OS, FreeBSD (IP addresses 10.3.1.19 and
10.3.1.20) resulted in two successful OS guesses; however, a third scan crashed
which indicated NMAP was not able to guess the OS at all. A fourth SYN scan was
conducted to check if the results of the third test was a chance outcome, though the
result showed a crash again.

82

SUEN YEK

APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION

UDP scans
Successful NMAP, UDP scans, that were able to guess the correct OS, were only on
the Cisco router, AIX, Novell and OpenBSD. All other OS's could not be guessed.
This indicated that the NMAP fingerprint file possibly did not have an OS fingerprint
record for UDP ports on those unsuccessful OS's.

FIN, XMAS, and NULL scans
FIN scans were able to guess the OS reliably in most cases, except one instance with
Novell Netware (IP 1 0.3 . 1 .18), but was not able to identify any of the IP addresses
that were assigned the default FreeBSD, and Solaris (10.3.1.17). FIN and NULL
scans also produced the default FreeBSD OS guess for the Cisco Aironet
(10.3.1.200). However, all other scans on 10.3.1.200 resulted in a crash and no OS
guess at all. Therefore, NMAP was overall ineffective at guessing the Cisco Aironet
OS.

NULL scans could successfully identify the Cisco router, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, AIX,
and Novell. The XMAS scans resulted in a correct remote OS guess for the Cisco
router, AIX, OpenBSD and Novell. All other NULL and XMAS scans could not find
an OS match for the fingerprint. This indicated that opened and closed ports on those
OS's did not respond in an expected RST, or an ignore response, so that NMAP
could identify the OS. Consequently, those OS's could not be identified by an
NMAP, UDP scan.
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Cisco Router/Switch with IOS
1 12
.

4 0
2

FreeBSD2.2. 1 -STABLE

2

4 0
Default FreeBSD2.2 . 1 -STABLE 0
OpenBSD2.7 /SPARC or NFR
IDS A pliance ( 12 /10 0/ 0 )

4 0
0

Novell Netware 3 . 12 - 5.00

4

4

4 0

Default FreeBSD2.2 . 1 -STABLE 2

2

Default FreeBSD2.2. 1 -STABLE 2

2

0

4

Aironet AP4800 E v8 0. 7 Aironet (Cisco?) 1 1 Mbps
wireless access oint

TABLE 6. 2 Results of Round 1 NMAP scans

./= number of correct OS guesses; x = number of incorrect OS guesses or no OS match; D = a Boolean value (True or False) indicating if the
deception was achieved through a correct OS guess on each scan;
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The Round 1 NMAP scans indicated that NMAP is was always reliable on a single
scan attempt; several scan attempts were required to check the reliability of scan
results. Additionally, not all scan types could successfully identify a correct OS
match. This indicated that not all the NMAP OS fingerprints have the ability to
detect the OS when attempting unconventional TCP connections.
6.4.2 Round 1 Nessus testing
Round 1 testing using Nessus aimed to determine if Nessus would be deceived by
returning the OS platform with a list of the services available, as specified by the
Honeyd configuration file. Nessus also utilises NMAP scanning however unlike
NMAP, Nessus will not assume that a given service will operate on an expected
TCP/IP port. Nessus will test the security of every port regardless of the version
number of the service (Deraison, 2003b ). This allows Nessus to generate information
on the security warnings, holes and vulnerabilities which in tum provides significant
OS exploit opportunities to a would be attacker.

For the purpose of the Round 1 Nessus baseline testing, it was only necessary for
Nessus to report the matching remote OS guess and exploitable security information
on ports/services set in the Honeyd configuration file for each OS.

Three Nessus scans were conducted on each IP to ensure validity. All three tests
conducted on each of the IP's returned the same results indicating the Nessus scans
gave consistent results. Each Nessus scan generated a report that listed the TCP/IP
ports opened and any related security warnings, vulnerabilities (security holes), and
the level of the security threat posed (indicated as a low, medium or high). Table 6.3
is a table of the results from the Round 1 Nessus scans.
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3com Office Connect Router 810
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 11.2
FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE
1
Solaris 2.6 - 7 (SPARC)
enBSD 2.6-2.8
"' Solaris 2.6 - 7 (SPARC)
Novell Netware 5.x
FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE

1

1
1
1
1
1

FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE

1

1

FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE

1

�

1

TABLE 6. 3 Results from Round 1 Nessus scans
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Nessus was able to successfully guess all but two OS's and report security holes,
warnings, and vulnerabilities that applied to services run on each OS. Nessus scans
performed on the Cisco router and hub/switch (10.3.1.1 and 10.3.1.12) returned
telnet service warnings and one security vulnerability/hole. Nessus was also able to
pick up the default OS (FreeBSD), AIX, Solaris (10.3.1.17), OpenBSD and Novell
with at least one warning on each OS.

Nessus indicated IP 10.3.1.15 as a Solaris OS when in fact the default OS (FreeBSD)
would have been the correct OS guess. Additionally IP 10.3.1.200 came up as the
default OS and not the Cisco Aironet AP. These errors indicated that the Honeyd
configuration file most likely had an error with the Solaris and Cisco Aironet
personality signatures that would need correcting for Round 2 testing.

6.5 Implications of Round 1 Testing
The overall results from Round 1 testing reported on attacks and intrusions that were
conducted on ring 1 of the defence, FakeAP and ring 2, Honeyd. Results from ring 1
testing showed that the fake access point could be sniffed and identified by the
wireless sniffing tools Kismet and Netstumbler. The information collected by the
sniffing tools identified the existence of an AP by the SSID, IP address, MAC
address, channel used, and a potential gateway to a private wireless network (Honeyd
virtual networks).

Results from ring 2 testing utilised network scanning tools NMAP and Nessus to
enumerate remote OS guesses of a private network (Honeyd virtual networks) and
their matching IP's by using various stealth scans. Nessus was able to give further
OS security warnings, vulnerabilities and holes on services running on the scanned
OS through brute forced probes.
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Consequently, Round 2 of the testing will involve further NMAP and Nessus probes
on a reconfigured Honeyd network to investigate if the scanning tools may detect all
the OS's.

88

SUEN YEK

APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION

7

CHAPTER 7 - ROUND 2 RESULTS

7.1 Reconfiguring Honeyd
For Round 2 testing, Honeyd was reconfigured to reflect a more realistic layout of a
corporate wireless network. Figure 7.1 illustrates the revised Honeyd virtual
networks as a logical configuration. The Linux Mandrake 9.0 machine was
maintained as the honeypot installed with FakeAP and Honeyd. The gateway IP
address of FakeAP, which is also the access point gateway to the Honeyd virtual
networks, remained as 1 92. 1 68 . 1 .99. The network topology of routers, servers, and
client machines are presented as a structured logical layout in Figure 7 . 1 . This model
was validated as a practicable network configuration by (Dawson, 2003 ; Valli,
2003a, personal communication).

The logical network topology of the Honeyd virtual networks encompasses three
subnets separated by Routerone, a hub and Routertwo. The first network (network
address 10.1 .0.0) utilises Routerone with IP address 1 0. 1 . 1 . 1 as the first route entry
into the network. Only the Cisco Aironet AP shares the same network address as
Routerone.

The second subnet has the network address of 1 0.2. 1 .0 and is intended to be seen as a
corporate Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) containing all the network servers. Six OS
platforms are allocated to six IP address spaces in this network. A second linked
route entry using a hub (IP 1 0.2. 1 . 1 ) separates the OS platforms Linux, AIX,
OpenBSD, Solaris, FreeBSD and Novell. These OS's were chosen to represent a
variety of platforms with testable vulnerabilities. Changes to the application level
involved the appropriate Web service for each OS platform, which is identified as
APACHE for the majority of OS's.
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The third subnet uses the network IP address of 1 0.3. 1 .0 and a connecting route entry
via Routertwo (IP 1 0.3 . 1 . 1 ). This subnet encompasses a network of all the
unallocated IP spaces that will be assigned the default OS through ARPD. Therefore,
all IP address spaces in network three are Windows 98 machines. The purpose of this
network is to appear as an assembly of Windows 98 client machines that access the
servers and services from the DMZ. Table 7. 1 identifies the precise NMAP OS
signature, and accompanying technical configurations for the revised Honeyd virtual
networks.
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H oneypot with FakeAP
1 92 . 1 68 . 1 . 99

N e tw o rk A d d re s s 1 0 . 1 . 1 . 0

t'"'?t'f
Routerone
1 0. 1 . 1 . 1

C isco A P
1 0. 1 . 1 .2

DMZ

N e tw o rk A d d re s s 1 0 . 2 . 1 . 0
H u b/Switch
1 0.2. 1 . 1

A IX W eb S erver
1 0.2. 1 .3
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-
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-

-

O penB S D W e b S e rver
1 0 . 2 . 1 .4

-

-

-

---

Free B S D W e b S erver
1 0 . 2 . 1 .6

N e tw o rk A d d re s s 1 0 . 3 . 1 . 0
-

-

-
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-
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-
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R outertwo
1 0 .3. 1 . 1

FIGURE 7. 1

Revised honeyd virtual networks - logical configuration
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3com Office Connect Router 810
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 11.2
Cisco 726 Non-IOS Software release
4.1(2) or 766 ISDN router
Aironet AP4800E v8.07 - Aironet
(Cisco?) 11 Mbps wireless access
oint
Solaris 2.6 - 7 X86
FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE
Novell Netware 3.12 - 5.00
. Linux Kernel 2.4.0 - 2.4.18 (X86)
AIX v4.2
OpenBSD 2. 7/SP ARC or NFR IDS
A pliance ( 12/10/00 )
Windows98 w/ Service Pack 1

TCP 23 - TELNET
TCP 23 - TELNET
TCP 23 - TELNET
10.1.1.0

10.1.1.2

10.2.1.0
10.2.1.0
10.2.1.0
10.2.1.0
10.2.1.0

10.2.1.5
10.2.1.6
10.2.1.7
10.2.1.2
10.2.1.3

10.2.1.0

10.2.1.4

10.3.1.0

Unassigned

HTTP 80 - WEB
HTTP 80 - WEB
HTTP 80 - WEB
HTTP 80 - WEB
HTTP 80 - WEB
TCP 21 - FTP
HTTP 80 - WEB

TABLE 7. 1 Revised Honeyd virtual networks - technical configuration
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7.2 Round 2 Testing
7.2.1 Round 2 NMAP testing
The purpose of Round 2 NMAP testing was to investigate if the reconfigured
Honeyd could deceive NMAP. This would be achieved through NMAP guessing the
correct remote OS using the same scan techniques. Corrections were made to the
Honeyd configuration file to remove errors and ensure that all the scripts were
accurately matched to an NMAP prescribed signature. The same five NMAP scans,
SYN, FIN, XMAS, NULL and UDP were conducted as in Round 1 , however for
Round 2, five scans were performed to validate the final NMAP scan/test results.
Table 7 .3 shows the findings from the Round 2 NMAP scans.
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3com Office Connect Router 8 10
Aironet AP4 800 E v8 .0 7 - Aironet
(Cisco?) 11 Mbps wireless access
point
Windows9 8 w/ Service Pack 1
Network Address
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 112
.
Linux Kernel2.4.0 -2.4.1 8 (X86)
AIX v42
.
OpenBSD2.7 /SPARC or NFR IDS
A liance 12/10 0/ 0 )
Solaris2 6
. -7 X86
FreeBSD2.2.1 -STABLE
Novell Netware 3.12 -50. 0
Windows9 8 w/ Service Pack 1
Network Address
Cisco 726 Non-IOS Software
release4.1 2) or 766 ISDN router
Windows9 8 w/ Service Pack 1

4
4
5
5
5
5

1
1
0
0
0
0

0
0
5
3
3
5

5
5
0
2
2
0

TABLE 7. 2 Results from Round 2 NMAP scans

,/= number of correct OS guesses; .)( = number of of incorrect OS guesses or no OS match; D = a Boolean value (True or False) indicating if the
deception was achieved through a correct OS guess on each scan
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SYN scans
The SYN scan was conducted first with results that differed from the Round 1
NMAP, SYN scans. The Cisco routers, AP, hub, Linux, AIX, OpenBSD and Novell
could all be successfully fingerprinted. However, the Solaris and FreeBSD OS
platforms could not be guessed by any NMAP, SYN scan. Additionally, the default

Windows 98 IP's were successfully fingerprinted until half way through the 4th round
of SYN scans, when NMAP continuously crashed on all IP's scanned with the
default OS of Windows 98.

An interesting software anomaly found in the NMAP scans was that the network
addresses were also scanned (on all scan types), although the network address was
not specified to be scanned by the researcher. As the network addresses were not
allocated any instructions in the Honeyd configuration file (such as a request timed
out message), the default OS should have been assigned by ARPD.

For half the SYN scans conducted, each network address scanned returned the
default OS of Windows 98. However, as the OS guesses on the default designated
IP's began to crash half way through the NMAP SYN scans, returning an
unsuccessful NMAP fingerprint and subsequently no OS guess, so did the network
addresses.

FIN scans
Round 2 of FIN scans indicated the NMAP was able to successfully fingerprint and
guess the correct remote OS for both Routers, the Cisco Aironet AP, hub, Linux,
AIX, OpenBSD and Novell. Failed NMAP fingerprints using a FIN scan could not
identify Solaris, FreeBSD and any of the default OS allocated IP addresses.

XMAS, NULL, and UDP stealth scans
Round 2 of the XMAS, NULL and UDP scans returned almost identical results,
except the first NULL scan conducted on Linux; which NMAP could not fingerprint.
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XMAS, NULL, and UDP scans were able to guess the correct OS for the AP, Linux,
AIX, OpenBSD, and Novell. The Cisco Routers, hub, Solaris, FreeBSD, and all
default IP addresses could not be fingerprinted.

Another NMAP abnormality that became apparent was in the XMAS scans where
the network addresses were scanned in-between each selected scanned IP in the
network. The number of scans conducted on each network address is given below:
•

10.1.1.0 - scanned 3 times

•

10.2.1.0 - scanned 8 times

•

10.3.1.0 - scanned 2 times

It was not known why the NMAP XMAS scans did this, although it may be
attributable to a software error.

7.2.2 Round 2 Nessus testing
Round 2 of the Nessus scans was aimed to investigate if Nessus could be deceived by
the revised Honeyd, and potentially appear realistic to an attacker scanning the
network. Nessus was required to guess the remote OS platform and any security
information that would be exploitable for a would-be attacker.

For the Round 2 testing, five scans were attempted on each OS allocated IP address
in Honeyd. However, it was found that Nessus was not able to scan the IP 10.1.1.1
(Routerone) at all, and any default OS assigned IP addresses, such as in network
10.3.1.0 (excluding 10.3.1.1, which is Routertwo) would take an extensively long
time and resulted in a Nessus Crash. The 3com Office Connect Router 810 on IP
10.1.1. 1 would stop and close at every attempt made by the researcher to scan the IP.
Consequently, the results shown in Table 7.4 exclude the OS platforms, and IP
addresses that Nessus could not scan.
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No OS guess
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 11.2
,, Linux Kernel 2.4.0 - 2.5.20
AIX v4.2

ess
� Novell NetWare 3.12 - 5.00
Cisco 762 Non-IOS Software
release 4.1(2) or 766 ISDN router

1
1
1

http 80/tcp
telnet 23/tcp

1

1

2

1

1

1
1

1

TABLE 7. 3 Results from Round 2 Nessus scans
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In the Round 2 Nessus tests, each Nessus scan generated a report that listed the ports
opened and any related security information such as the warnings, vulnerabilities
(security holes), and the level of the security threat posed. The results in Table 7.4
represent the outcomes from all five scans conducted on each of the IP addresses
listed.

Each of the 5 scans performed on all the listed IP' s produced the same findings
except for the

4

th

Nessus scan conducted on IP 1 0.2. 1 . 1 (Cisco Router/Switch with

IOS 1 1 .2), which produced two security warnings. The other four scans performed
on 1 0.2. 1 . 1 produced only one warning, as demonstrated in Table 7.4. In the Round 2
Nessus testing, this was the only irregular finding. This indicated that the Nessus
software was subject to some differences when used continually to scan IP addresses.

However, Nessus was still able to guess the remote OS for the Cisco Routers, Linux,
AIX, OpenBSD, Solaris, and Novell. Additionally, Nessus found at least one security
vulnerability and/or vulnerability (hole) on each of the OS's for a potential attacker
to investigate further and exploit.

Nessus was not able to guess the OS for IP 1 0.2. l .6 which was FreeBSD. It is
probable that Nessus was unsure of the exact OS on the IP 1 0.2. 1 .6; however, a
warning was still found from the N essus probes performed on that OS. Below is the
warning generated by the Nessus scan performed on 1 0.2. 1 .6:

Warning found on port general/tcp
The remote host uses non-random IP IDs, that is, it is
possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of
the ip packets sent by this host.
An attacker may use this feature to determine if the remote
host sent a packet in reply to another request. This may be
used for portscanning and other things.
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Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch
Risk factor : Low
Nessus I D : 1 0201

As the attacker usually cannot differentiate if this warning is a false-positive, it may
not matter if the OS was undetectable. The deception is this instance is that the
warning provides a misleading vulnerability of the potential OS. This may still be
exploited by an attacker by searching the vulnerability on the Internet to discover
how it may be exploited. Example sites are CERT, Bugtraq, CVE and SecuriTeam
vulnerability search engines and databases.

It was not known why IP 1 0. 1 .1 . 1 , Routerone with the OS of 3com Office Connect
Router 8 1 0, could not be scanned at all. Nessus would attempt to initiate a
connection but then drop the scan without producing any findings. Additionally,
Nessus was ineffective at scanning a target machine with the default OS allocated to
the IP. Nessus would complete the scan after an extensively long time. Each scan
usually had duration of approximately 15minutes. The Windows 98 IP addresses
lasted for up to 45 minutes, and Nessus would then crash without producing a
generated report of results.

7.2.3 Results from the Central Logging Structure (CLS)
The intended purpose of the CLS was to provide a supplementary method of data
collection to triangulate and verify attacks made on the wireless honeypot. The CLS
comprised of the Honeyd log files, which demonstrated themselves to be lacking in
the richness of information given. The Honeyd logs only indicated that TCP/IP ports
had some activity, and did not give further information of the possible attacks being
performed on the network level. Therefore, the researcher discovered that the
Honeyd log files were not effective in aiding the deceptions.
The SNORT log files verified the attacks achieved by Nessus. This was useful for the
researcher as it provided triangulated verification of the Nessus generated reports of
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scans. This also aided the deceptions through camouflaged that concealed the
victim' s knowledge of attacker activity.

7.3

Implications of Round 2 Testing

The overall results gathered from Round 2 testing focussed on NMAP and Nessus
scans and probes. Honeyd was reconfigured to overcome suspected errors found in
Round 1 , NMAP and Nessus tests. However, for Round 2 testing, Honeyd did not
demonstrate that it could deceive effectively all the NMAP and Nessus attacks.
Both NMAP and Nessus revealed software abnormalities through performing
additional scans that were not requested by the researcher, and refusing to perform
scans that were requested by the researcher. However, NMAP was able to detect
three OS's across all the five scan types out of sixteen that were scanned, and they
were AIX, OpenBSD, and the Cisco Aironet AP. This indicated that some of the
Honeyd deceptions were successful in fooling NMAP. Nessus reported at least one
security warning or vulnerability on all the OS' s that it could perform a complete
scan. Honeyd was therefore effective at deceiving Nessus for only nine out of the
possible twelve scans.
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CHAPTER 8 - DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Results from Round 1 and Round 2 testing are combined in a discussion relating to
the research questions:
1. Can a framework for deception be applied to common network
countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks?
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot against brute force attacks?
3. Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by the type of attack?

8.1

Can a Framework for Deception be applied to Common Network
Countermeasures to Reduce the Effectiveness of Attacks?

8.1.1 Ring 1 - FakeAP
The deceptions for FakeAP resulted as highly effective countermeasures against the
network attacks of the wireless sniffing tools Kismet and Netstumbler. The
framework was used to determine how to implement the deceptions for FakeAP. The
identified deceptions were mimicry, misleading, and decoying.

The forensic data that was collected from Kismet and Netstumbler indicated they
were both misled into believing a bogus AP existed. This was done by FakeAP's
mimicry of a real AP. It is also likely that the decoyed deception would be achieved,
if a potential attacker were able to sniff the bogus AP. This is because the attacker
consumes time and resources when sniffing the fake AP; and consequently, the
attacker may become deterred from a real AP.

A script kiddie using Kismet or Netstumbler may be misled into thinking a real AP
existed. Furthermore, the potential attacker could think there is a network behind the
AP that may be scanned, probed, and exploited. Thus, the deceptions implemented
on FakeAP, which were identified from the framework, were effective
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countermeasures on the wireless honeypot against the attacking tools Kismet and
Netstumbler.
8.1.2 Ring 2 - Honeyd
The deceptions employed by the Honeyd virtual networks were not effective, on
every occasion, in deceiving the attack tools used. The framework identified mimicry
and misleading deceptions for the Honeyd countermeasures. This was to be
demonstrated through faked: OS's, login-banners, services, and OS vulnerabilities.

The attacking tool NMAP was used first to determine if it would be able to guess the
OS on each of the IP's scanned. Subsequently, this was used to determine if Honeyd
was able to mimic all the OS's.
Evaluating theframework in reducing the effectiveness ofNMAP attacks
NMAP was unable to detect all the OS's in both Round 1 and Round 2 testing.
However, through the application of the framework, the researcher found a highly
useful method for understanding how to deploy Honeyd deceptions. The researcher
learned the value of OS mimicry as a significant network countermeasure against
attacks. This was demonstrated by NMAP's ability to fingerprint three of the Honeyd
OS's.

In Round 2 of the NMAP scans, the Cisco Aironet AP, AIX, and OpenBSD OS's
indicated a highly effectively deception achieved, through OS mimicry. This was
demonstrated through successful OS guesses from NMAP, for each scan that was
conducted across all the five scan-types.

NMAP believed that the Cisco Aironet AP, AIX, and OpenBSD OS's were real. A
script kiddie would typically rely on NMAP to distinguish what is real and what is
not. Subsequently the attacker may begin probing those OS's for vulnerabilities
using a tool like Nessus. However, as the OS's are not real, the attacker would be
misled into wasting time and resources on the faked OS's.
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Therefore, in applying the framework to the wireless honeypot, it was determined
that OS mimicry was an effective deception used as a network countermeasure. This
was demonstrated through the successful mimicry of three OS's using Honeyd,
against the attacking tool NMAP. Additionally, effective OS mimicry would also
achieve a misleading deception for the potential script kiddie.

Evaluating theframework in reducing the effectiveness ofNess us attacks
The framework was also used to identify deceptions including faked: OS
vulnerabilities, security holes, login-banners, and services through mimicry and

I

i

misleading deceptions. These Honeyd deceptions were tested against Nessus scans.
The results showed that Nessus was not able to identify all the OS's, although, was
able to find at least one OS security warning or vulnerability for each of the scanned
OS's.

The mimicry of the faked login-banners on the Cisco routers appeared real, in
addition to the faked security warnings, and service vulnerabilities that Nessus found
on each of the OS's. These deceptions would typically fool a script kiddie. This is
because they would not normally be able to distinguish the difference between a
false-positive OS weakness, and a genuine OS weakness. The result would be that
the attacker would think any OS weakness found by Nessus would be an opportunity
for exploit.

The results from the Nessus reports were valuable in identifying the level of
deception achieved by Honeyd. The results revealed which countermeasures would
require a greater level of mimicry and misleading in order to fool the network attack
tool Nessus. An example was the web service run on each of the servers, which
Nessus identified as IIS v.5 in Round 1 . However, most of the server platforms
should have been using the APACHE web service. Therefore, this would was
changed to facilitate an effective deception of misleading the attacker for Round 2.

The framework was thus useful in identifying how each Honeyd countermeasure
may be implemented to deceive Nessus attacks. Additionally, the researcher found
1 03
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the framework to be highly useful for determining which deceptions may be
deployed on the wireless honeypot, against the attack tools NMAP, Kismet and
Netstumbler.

It may also be assumed that the framework would be useful for determining how to
implement deceptions to fool other network attacking tools. These include wireless
sniffing tools such as Dsniff, WaveLAN, and AirMagnet. Network security tools that
may also be used for attacking include SATAN, Whisker and WebTrends Security
Analyzer. therefore according to the results gathered by the experiment, the
researcher found that the framework for deception may be applied to common
network countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks.

8.2 How effective is Deception in a Wireless Honeypot against Brute
Force Attacks?
The brute force attacks that were tested against the wireless honeypot were primarily
Nessus scans and probes. Nessus uses NMAP stealth scans to guess the remote OS
and then forcibly probes each service with any known vulnerabilities. Nessus was
able to detect at least one security warning or vulnerability on each of the OS's
scanned. However, Nessus was not able to guess the correct OS on all scans, and in
addition was not able to scan all the OS's selected by the researcher.

In Round one of the Nessus testing, Nessus did not guess the OS for the Cisco
Aironet AP and guessed the default OS instead. It was discovered that the Honeyd
configuration file had an error and this was changed for the Round two testing.
However, after the reconfiguration of Honeyd for Round two testing, Nessus
produced less successful results. Nessus was not able to scan all the OS's and again,
was not able to guess the Cisco Aironet AP.

The researcher could not identify why the Nessus scans were less effective in Round
2 of the testing, than in Round 1 . Therefore, the researcher evaluated the
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effectiveness of NMAP scans as an aid to understanding the possible causes for the
irregularities found in the Nessus results.

It was also found that the NMAP scans were less successful at guessing the OS's in
Round 2 of the testing, than in Round 1 . Even after correcting the Honeyd
configuration file, not all the NMAP scans were able to successfully fingerprint and
guess the OS's. Moreover, the percentage of correct OS guesses achieved in the first
Round of testing was higher at 43 .6%, in comparison to the percentage of correct OS
guesses achieved in the second Round of testing; which was 33 .75%.

Furthermore, Figure 8 . 1 depicts a comparison of NMAP scan results for each scan
type performed in Round 1 and Round 2 tests. The diagram identifies that the SYN
scans conducted showed approximately 50% successful scans over the two Rounds
of testing. FIN and NULL scans were significantly improved in Round 1 , when
compared to Round 2 results. UDP scans were reasonably more successful in Round
1 , and XMAS scans produced some successful guesses in Round 2, compared to

none in Round 1 .

NMAP Com parison of Sca n Res u lts

C)
a..
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• Round 2
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G)
C)
a..
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Scan Type

FIGURE 8. 1 A comparison of NMAP scans performed
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The implications of these NMAP results indicated that in the experiment, NMAP was
could not reliably fingerprint the Honeyd OS's across the five scan types. No
correlated relationship between the IV and DV' s of Honeyd deceptions may be
drawn from these results.

The NMAP OS fingerprints selected for Honeyd were previously tested against all
five scan types in a wired environment. Each OS fingerprint was able to be
successfully detected by the NMAP SYN, FIN, XMAS, UPD and NULL scans
(Valli, 2003b). However, the results showed that NMAP was not able to fingerprint
successfully the OS's in a wireless environment using the same five scan types.

This may be attributable to a number of factors. The researcher's opinion is that the
network packet sequence and exchange over the wireless medium most likely caused
the irregularity in NMAP scan results. The open air allows a greater possibility of
disordered packet sequencing and loss of packets, than over wired media.

Another possibility may be that NMAP (the software) begins to crash when it is used
excessively for prolonged periods. Many of the NMAP scans were performed on up
to 1 6 IP spaces at a time, and scan types were executed consecutively. Additionally,
the ratio of correct OS guesses in the first Round of testing was higher than that of
the second Round of testing; which was 34 more scans.

Thus, the increased amount of scanning performed may have initiated a software
overload and produced erroneous packets. Therefore, NMAP' s inability to guess
correctly each of the OS's, may have been a carry-over effect on the Nessus scans.
This is because Nessus also utilises NMAP OS fingerprinting to guess the remote OS
in each scan, and then Nessus performs the brute force probing for vulnerabilities.

Nessus however, was able to guess correctly each of the OS platforms for all the
scans it completed, for both Round 1 and Round 2 testing. Nessus also generated at
least one security warning or vulnerability. Figure 8.2 outlines the scans results of
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both the Nessus scans conducted. The majority of Nessus scans produced the correct
OS, with security warnings or vulnerabilities. There were no more than two incorrect
guesses at a time and only in Round 2 of the Nessus scans, where there null/no
attempts. This indicated that Honeyd was effective on most occasions, at deceiving
Nessus; however, not in every case.

Nessus Comparison of Scan Resu lts
12
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CJ "C
U) Cl)

- ·>
0

... .c
Cl)

CJ

8

• Round 1

6

.c <(

4

z

2

• Round 2

0

Correct

Incorrect

No attempt

OS Scan Success
FIGURE 8. 2 A comparison of Nessus scans conducted

Therefore, the NMAP stealth scans and Nessus brute force attacks identified a
possible anomaly in the way wireless network scanning may be conducted.
Consequently, the results ascertained from the NMAP and Nessus tests indicated that
the deceptions used in the wireless honeypot were not effective on all occasions,
against the brute force attacks. This was demonstrated by the various discrepancies
found in the scan results, and the unpredictability of the wireless experimental
environment discussed above.

8.3

Under what Conditions and do Conditions vary by the type of
Attack?

The researcher determined how each experimental condition for each type of attack
was applied against the wireless honeypot. These were described in the research
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design through the rings of deception in depth, the way in which the deception would
be deployed, and any random variables that may distort the results.

8.3.1

Conditions for FakeAP attacks

The first Round of testing utilised Kismet and Netstumbler wireless sniffing tools for
attacking ring one of the deception, FakeAP. The experimental research design
identified the conditions for attack. This included the configurations of the attacking
machine, and the FakeAP configurations. These conditions were chosen to test if the
deceptions on FakeAP would fool the wireless sniffing tools used. The results
demonstrated that FakeAP was able to mimic a real AP and thus, was able to fool the
attack tools used.
The results from FakeAP testing on the wireless honeypot indicated that wireless
sniffing of an AP is an effective attack. This may be because the wireless
environment and the nature of the wireless tools used were conducive for AP
sniffing. Additionally, the researcher found that some conditions may vary by the
attack, however, they are the configurable parameters used by FakeAP.
The conditions that may be changed on FakeAP include testing of varying: distances
from the AP, signal strengths, and channels. These could be tested against different
wireless sniffing tools such as Dsniff, WaveLAN, and AirMagnet. Therefore, if
FakeAP is able to effectively mimic a real AP, other wireless sniffing-type attacks
may be deceived in a similar way.

8.3.2 Conditions for NMAP and Nessus attacks
The conditions for Honeyd identified OS and network mimicry, OS vulnerabilities,
and TCP/IP fingerspoofing as countermeasures for NMAP and Nessus wireless
attacks. It was found that NMAP and Nessus attacks did always achieve successful
results against Honeyd, within the wireless environment.
NMAP and Nessus are security tools that are also utilised for attacking purposes
through TCP/IP port scanning and probing for vulnerabilities in an OS. This type of
attack varies from the wireless sniffing tools that were used on FakeAP. FakeAP
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utilised the wireless medium effectively, to carry out the attacks against the wireless
honeypot. However, NMAP and Nessus were originally designed for the wired
network environment.
The researcher found the nature of network packets travelling through the air may be
a disruption to the way NMAP and Nessus scans are performed. Therefore, the
conditions for NMAP and Nessus attacks do vary in the wireless environment. The
conditions may be that NMAP and Nessus require a fixed medium to execute
effective scans that are able to guess the correct OS and vulnerabilities on every
occasion. This is likely because NMAP and Nessus rely on the packet sequencing of
TCP/IP handshakes to determine what the OS is. Therefore, if wireless packets are
more frequently lost, and packets are not received in the correct order, the likelihood
of failed OS guesses may be higher. The results from the NMAP and Nessus scans
support this possible deduction.
Consequently, the conditions for attacks perpetrated on the wireless honeypot did
vary by the type of attack. The researcher came to the conclusion that wireless
sniffing tools utilise the wireless medium effectively because they are designed to
enumerate static information on the physical layer ( of the OSI), which is the open air,
also used by FakeAP. However, network-attacking tools such as NMAP and Nessus
require a more reliable medium to conduct interactive and dynamic packet exchange.
Therefore, these attacks may require a stable network layer (of the OSI) of TCP/ IP
connectivity in order to achieve effective Honeyd attacks.
This is usually the case with wired media. However, the wireless medium does not
contain electromagnetic waves through rigid confines of a copper or optic cable, and
instead, allows the data signals to disperse with abandon. Therefore, the conditions
for NMAP and Nessus attacks varied significantly, on the stability of the software
and the network environment.
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CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSION

This research entitled A Deception Based Framework for the Application of
Deceptive Countermeasures in 802. 1 1 b Wireless Networks was experimental
research aimed to improve understanding of how deceptive methods may be used in
network defence. The researcher adopted an exploratory method for testing logical
and technical concepts to investigate the effectiveness of deceptions deployed on a
wireless honeypot. The results indicated how deceptions might be used as network
countermeasures against common brute force attacks.
The countermeasures were deployed as deception in depth on a wireless honeypot.
This included FakeAP and Honeyd as the primary honeypot. The attacks performed
were wireless sniffing tools Kismet and Netstumbler on FakeAP, and NMAP and
Nessus attacks on Honeyd. The deceptions deployed were mapped from a framework
that was used to identify how, and what type of deceptions the countermeasures and
the attacking tools may use.
The experimental approach and exploratory investigation allowed the researcher to
test dependent variables - DV' s (different types of deceptions), against an
independent variable - IV (the wireless honeypot). The outcomes gave indications of
cause and effect relationships between the IV and DV's. The researcher implemented
a set of conditions to test the deceptions on the IV, tested the outcomes, and then
reconfigured the IV, and tested again.
This was to ascertain experimental outcomes to answer the research questions:
1 . Can a framework for deception be applied to network countermeasures to
reduce the effectiveness of attacks?
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot used against brute force
attacks?
3. Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by the type of attack?
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Evaluating the effectiveness of deceptions in a wireless honeypot

The researcher found from the results that deceptions used on FakeAP were highly
effective against the wireless sniffing tools Kismet and Netstumbler. However, the
deceptions utilised by Honeyd were not effective, in all instances, against the
network attacking tools NMAP and Nessus.
It was determined from the results of all the attack tools used against the wireless
honeypot, that FakeAP was able to deploy the most effective deceptions because
FakeAP was designed for the wireless medium. The wireless sniffing tools Kismet
and Netstumbler could be deceived because they too, were tools that utilise the
wireless environment.
NMAP and Nessus however, have been primarily used in a wired environment
utilising TCP/IP connectivity at the network level. Because the network level
becomes blurred in a wireless environment, this may have been the reason why
Honeyd could not effectively deceive the attack tools NMAP and Nessus. Network
packets may have been lost, or disrupted packet sequencing may have caused
Honeyd and the attacking tools to have errors in their network communication.

9.1.2

Evaluating the application of the framework for deception

The researcher found the application of the framework to be highly useful for
mapping the network countermeasures and attacks to deceptions. It gave the
researcher a greater understanding of how each deceptive effect of masking, mimicry
and confusing may be implemented. Furthermore, different levels of deceptive
sophistication, active and passive states, as well as a defensive or offensive stance
were considered to heighten understanding of the deceptive effect.
The framework was therefore useful in determining which network countermeasures
were more effective against the attacks. It was observed that depending on the type
of deception, the countermeasure implemented, and the way it was deployed,
affected the success of the deception on the attack.
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Future research and investigation of deceptions

Deceptions may be investigated further by using FakeAP and Honeyd to deploy
deceptions identified in the framework that are more sophisticated. FakeAP may
incorporate wireless communication between more than one AP. This would be a
dynamic and mimicked deception for wireless sniffing tools and packet sniffers to
intercept.
Additionally, the deceptions deployed by Honeyd may incorporate more network and
application level interaction, also through a dynamic and mimicked deception. This
may be done by adding open ports, and running services to the Honeyd configuration
file. Each service may run a script that produces a login-banner to inform the attacker
of what service and OS is running. Additionally, a PERL script may be called for
other front-end applications, such as a web page. This may give additional richness
to the deception to a would-be attacker as a secondary step after using NMAP and
Nessus.
The investigation may still be exploratory, although a field type study would be
adopted instead. This would allow the researcher to deploy the wireless honeypot in
an 'live' and 'open' space (not in a laboratory), to observe the attacks perpetrated in
an uncontrolled environment. The results may give insight to how the effectiveness
of similar deceptions deployed in this experiment, may result in a live and open
environment.

9.1.4

Limitations in the research

There were several limitations within this research. The researcher had intended to
conduct a third round of attacks. These would have incorporated single-hit buffer
overflow attacks on the honeypot. This would yield useful results pertaining to the
effectiveness of deceptions against stealth attacks on the wireless honeypot.
However, the time constraint limited the researcher's ability to conduct testing
beyond Round two.
Additionally the researcher found that the Honeyd log files were lacking in providing
useful network information on extended network activity. Honeyd reported when
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packets were sent to a port, however, there was no additional information of the
protocol activity and exchange that occurred between the attacking machine and the
target wireless honeypot.
However, it was the researcher's main objective to measure the effectiveness of
deceptions used according to the results found through NMAP and Nessus scans. The
Central Logging Structure (CLS), which was the SNORT IDS and Honeyd logs,
were intended as a supplementary form of data collection to triangulate and verify
the results of NMAP and Nessus. It was anticipated that the CLS would provide
additional findings at the protocol level. This may have identified the honeypot' s
interpretation of what was happening from the victim's perspective. Nonetheless, the
scope of the research was to determine the level of deception achieved on tools that
would typically be used by a script kiddie.
Further research may use exploratory investigation to view the results from the
victim's point of view. This may determine the victim's perspective of the level of
deception achieved, which may then be compared to the attacker's perspective.
9.1.5

Assessing the effectiveness of deceptions used for network defence

The observed levels of deceptions achieved were significant for understanding how
wireless networks may improve security. The research honeypot gave insight into the
way deception may be effective or ineffective in a wireless environment against
common network attacks. FakeAP demonstrated itself to be a highly effective
deceptive tool for countering wireless sniffing tools. The Honeyd deceptions
demonstrated inconsistent results that indicated that network-attacking tools may not
be effectively deceived when used in a wireless environment.
This identified to the researcher the difficulties that may arise when deploying
network-based deceptions in a wireless environment. Based on the findings of this
experiment, it is the researcher's deduction that the effectiveness of deceptions used
in wireless network defence will need further investigation.
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